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
1860.

T A S M A N I A.

MILITARY DEFENCES (COLONIES).

COPY OF REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON EXPENSE OF
MILITARY DEFENCES IN THE COLONIES.

Laid upon the Table by Mr. Attorney-General, and ordered by the House to be
printed, 17 August, 1860.



COPY of Report of the Committee on Expense of Military Defences in the Colonies.

War Office, 14th March, 1859.

SIR,

I AM directed by Secretary Major-General Peel to request that you will represent to Secretary Sir E. B. Lytton that so great is the difficulty and embarrassment occasioned to this Department by the absence of any fixed and recognised principle for the guidance of the Secretary of State in determining the numerous questions of military expenditure which are continually arising in most of the Colonies, that Major-General Peel feels it to be highly desirable that steps should be at once taken for coming to an understanding with the several Colonies concerned on the subject.

So long as the Secretary of State for War was also Secretary of State for the Colonies, the inconvenience referred to was of course less severely felt, inasmuch as the Minister who filled the joint offices possessed means of information as to the actual requirements of the Colonies, and their ability or not to defray the cost involved, which enabled him readily to decide for himself how far it would be proper to grant or to refuse demands submitted to him from time to time for troops, military stores, &c. The duty and responsibility of dealing with such demands, and of explaining and defending to Parliament the expenditure incurred or proposed in respect of them, now devolve on a Minister who has no official knowledge of the political and social circumstances of the Colonies, and no means of communicating with Colonial Governments. It appears to General Peel that the adoption of arrangements which should define the respective liabilities of this Department and the various Colonial Governments, in respect to military expenditure, would relieve the Secretary of State for War from the difficulty in question, and would at the same time be more conducive to the interest and convenience of the Colonies themselves.

That such arrangements are practicable, and, where they do exist, are found to work satisfactorily, is proved by the example of Malta, Mauritius, the Ionian Islands, and Ceylon, which pay a contribution into the Exchequer in aid of military funds; and again by the example of New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia, which pay for military buildings and defences, and which are to defray the pay and allowances of any troops whom they may require beyond a specified number maintained from the Imperial Exchequer. Major General Peel would now propose to extend the principle of those arrangements to the rest of the Colonies, with such modifications as the variety of their circumstances may render necessary.

The general principle to be borne in view in negotiating with Colonial Governments on this subject would be, as General Peel conceives,—1st, that England should assist in the defence of her Colonies against aggression on the part of foreign civilized nations, and (in a less proportion) of formidable native tribes; but in no case, except where such Colonies are mere garrisons kept up for Imperial purposes, should she assume the whole of such defence. On the contrary, she should insist, as a condition of her aid, that the Colony should also contribute its share by maintaining, at its own expense, a local force, or, if circumstances appear to make that impossible, by paying part of the expense of the Imperial garrison; and, 2nd, that military expenditure, for purposes of internal police, should be defrayed from local funds, there being no grounds for drawing any distinction between a Colony and an independent nation in this respect; and the preservation of internal peace and order being properly thrown upon local authorities, both because it depends upon their own legislation and management, and because the local population is mainly, if not exclusively, interested in it.

These being the general principles on which General Peel conceives that the arrangement to be entered into with the respective Colonial Legislatures should be based, he would, in the event of their being concurred in and adopted by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury (to whom a corresponding communication has been made), suggest that the business of preparing for the consideration of Her Majesty's Govern-

ment a scheme for the application of them to each Colony, should be confided to a committee, consisting of three members, one to be nominated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, one by the Lords of the Treasury, and one by the Secretary of State for War.

I have, &c.
(Signed) B. HAWES.

H. MERIVALE, *Esq.*
Colonial Office.

R E P O R T.

IN obedience to the instructions which we have received, we have inquired into and considered the relations of the Colonies of Great Britain to the mother country, as regards the expenditure on their military defence.

The duties imposed on us were explained in a letter from General Peel, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 14 March 1859, in consequence of which the committee was appointed. A copy of the letter is appended. In that communication General Peel states—

That he feels great difficulty and embarrassment from the absence of any fixed and recognised principle for the guidance of the Secretary of State for War in determining the numerous questions of military expenditure which are continually arising in most of the Colonies; that he considers it highly desirable that steps should be at once taken for coming to an understanding with the several Colonies on the subject; and that it appears to him that the adoption of arrangements which should define the respective liabilities of the War Department and the various Colonial Governments in respect of military expenditure would relieve the Secretary of State from the difficulties in question, and would at the same time be more conducive to the interest and convenience of the Colonies themselves.

The principles suggested by General Peel as the basis of such arrangements are as follows:—

1. England should assist in the defence of her Colonies against aggression on the part of foreign nations, but in no case, except where such Colonies are mere garrisons kept up for Imperial purposes, should she assume the whole of such defence; but, on the contrary, she should insist, as a condition of her aid, that the Colony should also contribute its share by maintaining at its own expense a local force; or if circumstances appear to make that impossible, by paying part of the expense of the Imperial garrison; and

2. Military expenditure, for purposes of internal police, should be defrayed from local funds, there being no grounds for drawing any distinction between a Colony and an independent nation in this respect, and the preservation of internal peace and order being properly thrown on local authorities, both because it depends upon their own legislation and management, and because the local population is mainly, if not exclusively, interested in it.

General Peel concludes by proposing that a committee shall be appointed to prepare a scheme for the application of these principles to each Colony.

In conformity with these views, which were concurred in generally by the Lords of the Treasury and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, we submit the following Report:—

We desire to state at the outset, that while willing to apply our best judgment and means of information, in obedience to the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, we feel sensibly the peculiar difficulties of the task imposed upon us. Few political questions involve greater difficulties and matter of more grave consideration than the relations between England and her colonial possessions—relations to which, as a whole, whether we consider the extent of those possessions, the diversities of race, interests, position, and circumstances which they comprise, or the various titles of conquest, treaty, and colonization by which we hold them, there appears nothing even remotely analogous in the history of the world.

In suggesting therefore, changes of an important character in those relations, we feel that we are dealing with questions of policy which properly belong to the higher departments of Government, and that our plans may be open to practical objections of which we have no means of estimating the force.

But though conscious of our disadvantages in this respect, we have thought it our duty not to shrink from stating fully and plainly our own conclusions, however imperfect, on the matter referred to us, especially as Her Majesty's Government will have no difficulty in applying to them the necessary qualifications.

The first point to which it is our duty to call attention is the fact that the Colonies of Great Britain may be said, speaking generally, to have been free from the obligation of contributing, either by personal service or money payment, towards their own defences—a state of things which we believe to have no parallel or precedent in the case of any other organised community of which the history is known.*

We subjoin a return of the military force and the expenditure for military purposes in our Colonies for 1857-8, the last year for which we have complete accounts.† It will be seen that,

* It is worth while to note, as showing by contrast the liberality with which England treats her Colonies, the financial relations between those of the only two European nations besides ourselves which possess colonies of any importance, and the mother countries. In 1857 (the last year for which we have been able to obtain a financial statement) the surplus revenue paid by the Dutch colonies into the metropolitan exchequer, after defraying all their military and naval expenses, was 31,858,421 florins (about £2,600,000.) The estimated surplus revenue from the Spanish colonies for the past year was 115,000,000 reals (about £1,150,000.) *Ministerial Statement in the Dutch Chambers; (Journal of the Hague, November 9, 1859.) Anuario Económico-Estadístico de España for 1859.*

† A RETURN showing the Force stationed in the Colonies, and the Expenditure incurred for their Defence, by the Imperial and Colonial Governments respectively, during the Year ending 31 March, 1858.

	Average Numbers of all Arms and Ranks, including Civil Departments, attached to the Army.	Imperial Expenditure.							Total of Imperial Expenditure for Military Purposes.	Colonial Expenditure for Military Purposes.	GROSS TOTAL.
		Pay and Allowances, Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	Stores.	Proportion of Recruiting Expenses.	Barracks and Fortifications.	Proportion of Non-Effective Services.	Proportion of Departmental Expenses at Home.	Transport and Freight.			
		£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
North America :											
Canada	3137	180,799	3150	2348	7355	41,482	3556	22,743	261,933	40,610	302,543
Nova Scotia	2291	110,907	6624	2088	21,761	30,464	2611	16,610	191,065	432	191,497
New Brunswick											
Newfoundland	231	13,673	598	208	955	3066	263	1675	20,438	—	20,438
Australia :											
Tasmania	488	49,034	192	432	1346	6356	545	3806	61,711	—	61,711
New Zealand	1690	100,702	1152	1544	1303	22,554	1933	13,182	142,370	—	142,370
New South Wales	906	33,472	289	822	222	12,180	872	7067	54,924	72,440	127,364
Victoria	888	23,701	336	816	—	11,872	1012	6926	44,663	94,029	138,692
South Australia	91	5,178	392	80	—	1190	102	710	7652	3226	10,878
Western Australia	365	20,051	1332	168	155	5327	416	2847	30,296	—	30,296
Mediterranean :											
Gibraltar	5053	237,013	27,867	4648	11,539	67,302	5812	28,423	383,104	—	383,104
Malta	6290	287,428	13,677	5792	15,636	84,490	7242	35,381	449,646	6237	455,883
Ionian Islands	3513	123,418	4132	3224	6879	47,124	4039	19,761	208,577	19,000	227,577
Cape of Good Hope	10,759	600,107	8042	7712	7326	112,462	9640	50,995	796,284	34,403	830,687
Bermuda	1188	68,041	3144	1080	1437	15,778	1352	9504	100,336	—	100,336
Bahamas	397	24,440	4667	320	994	5124	439	3176	39,160	—	39,160
St. Helena	478	25,550	2330	432	1494	6356	545	4777	41,484	625	42,109
Falklands	37	2069	—	32	—	504	43	696	3344	—	3344
West Indies :											
Jamaica	1784	94,603	2514	1608	1348	23,492	2014	14,272	139,851	2231	142,082
Honduras	227	12,964	221	200	243	2954	253	1816	18,651	—	18,651
Windward and Leeward Islands	2364	149,094	18,115	2136	3309	31,122	2668	18,912	225,356	12,167	237,523
Eastern :											
Ceylon	2386	62,268	998	2192	151	31,920	2736	15,420	115,685	74,359	190,044
Mauritius	850	44,780	712	768	10,928	11,186	959	7001	76,334	17,795	94,129
Hong Kong	826	63,151	1690	752	2339	10,976	941	7789	87,638	—	87,638
Labuan (no Queen's Troops).			Amount	paid to	the East	India	Company		8035	—	8035
Western Coast of Africa :											
Sierra Leone	356	19,664	3219	320	734	4662	400	2848	31,847	208	32,055
Gambia	365	20,881	641	328	902	4788	410	2920	30,870	161	31,031
Gold Coast	291	10,582	1624	272	—	3948	338	2328	19,092	330	19,422
TOTAL	47,251	2,383,570	107,658	40,822	98,356	599,179	51,141	301,585	3,590,346	378,253	3,968,599

including the cost of the Cape German Legion, the military expenditure amounted to £3,968,599. Of this only £378,253 was contributed by the Colonies, being less than one-tenth part of the whole; and of that contribution about two-thirds were paid by three Colonies, New South Wales, Victoria, and Ceylon. It is remarkable that no Colony except Canada, and, to a very small extent, Victoria, the Cape, and one or two of the West India Colonies, had organised a militia or other local force.

We consider that this immunity, throwing as it does the defence of the Colonies almost entirely on the mother country, is open to two main objections. In the first place, it imposes an enormous burden and inconvenience on the people of England, not only by the addition which it makes to their taxes, but by calling off to remote stations a large proportion of their troops and ships, and thereby weakening their means of defence at home. But a still more important objection is, the tendency which this system must necessarily have to prevent the developement of a proper spirit of self-reliance amongst our Colonists, and to enfeeble their national character. By the gift of political self-government, we have bestowed on our Colonies a most important element of national education; but the habit of self-defence constitutes a part hardly less important of the training of a free people, and it will never be acquired by our Colonists if we assume exclusively the task of defending them.

Next to the inadequacy of the contributions of our Colonies towards their defences, the most conspicuous defect in the present system is its inequality as among the Colonies themselves. For example, the colony of Victoria paid in 1857-58 about two-thirds of its ordinary military expenditure, and has this year in addition voted large sums for fortifications. In the same year, Ceylon paid about two-fifths, and Canada one-fifth part respectively, of their whole military expenditure; while Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Tasmania, New Zealand, and many other Colonies paid nothing at all. Above all, there is the gigantic anomaly of the expenditure on the Cape. We cannot avoid calling the especial attention of Her Majesty's Government to the drain on British resources which has resulted from our undertaking the defence of this Colony, and to the inadequacy of the benefits resulting to British interests. As affording a field of emigration, a supply of our wants, or a market for our produce, our connexion with the Colony has not been, comparatively speaking, of any considerable advantage to us; in fact, the only direct object of Imperial concern, is the use of the roadsteads at Table and Simon's Bays. Yet in 1857-58, a period of exceptional tranquillity, we had at the Cape, including the German Legion, a garrison, or rather an army, of 10,759 regular troops, and the military expenditure alone was £830,687, equal to more than one-fifth of the expenditure on the whole of the Colonies, including the Mediterranean garrisons. Since that time the force has been materially reduced, but this year new works have been begun (at the expense of the Imperial Treasury); and the general officer commanding has informed the Governor that if they are to be completed, manned, and armed, he will require an additional force to be placed at his disposal of at least four regiments of infantry, 850 artillery, 400 cavalry, and a proportion of engineers. On the other hand, the whole contribution of the Colony to the enormous cost of its defence consisted in a small body of frontier police, the expense of which was £34,403.

Nor is the inequality in our mode of treating our Colonies less remarkable than that of their contributions. For example, though the people of Victoria contribute, as we have shown, most liberally and largely, we have lately, at great expense and inconvenience, removed part of the regiment quartered there, on the express ground that Victoria refused to pay for more than four companies, to Tasmania, which not only does not pay for those troops, but contributes nothing in any shape to military purposes. Again, we have removed the troops from Antigua, on the ground that the Colony would not provide barracks for them, to Barbadoes, where we provide barracks for them ourselves. Again, Canada is the first British Colony which has set the example of organising a militia; she has done this entirely at her own expense, including the arming and clothing of the men, and we have refused to contribute anything towards it, going so far as to demand payment for some great coats and smooth-bore muskets, which happened to be in store on the spot, and which we have issued to them. Yet at the same time, we are distributing, gratis, from the store at Quebec a large quantity of the best Enfield rifles to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, for the use of volunteers, although we have never been able to induce those Colonies to organise a militia or to contribute one farthing, in any shape, towards their own defence.

A further anomaly exists as regards the issue of "colonial allowances" to Her Majesty's troops. In some colonies, viz., Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, Ceylon, and Mauritius, very liberal allowances are given by the Colonial Government to the officers, and, in the three first cases, to the men, over and above what they are entitled to by regulation. The results of this exceptional liberality are,—

1. That the Imperial Government is in a manner forced to give corresponding allowances in neighbouring Colonies, although it may not consider them to be called for. This is actually the case as regards Tasmania and New Zealand, where the Secretary of State decided that the

time was come for such allowances to be discontinued; but where it was found practically impossible to carry that decision into effect so long as the neighbouring Colonies continued to give them. 2. That troops serving in Colonies of which the Governments are not so liberal are placed at an invidious and unjust disadvantage; there is as much reason for giving extra allowances at Jamaica and Demerara as there is at Ceylon or Mauritius, although the former do not choose to give them, and the latter do. 3. That the remuneration given to the Queen's troops, enlisted for general service, is made to fluctuate at the pleasure of Colonial Governments, and according to the state of their finances; which appears to us objectionable and improper.

It is not surprising that a state of things so anomalous and irregular should lead to disputes and confusion. Not a year passes without the occurrence of difficulties and discussions with regard to the respective liabilities of the Imperial and the Colonial Governments in every part of the world; and it is to be observed that such questions are never settled; they are adjourned for the moment, leaving behind them often much soreness on both sides, and the Imperial Government almost invariably yielding the points at issue; but the next year, or the year after, they are raised again, there being no recognised principles of mutual relations to which appeal can be made or upon which a permanent settlement can be founded.

Having pointed out, as above, the evils of the present system, we proceed to submit our proposals for altering it. Before doing so it will be convenient to state the general principles on which we believe such alteration should be founded.

In the first place, while we recognise to the full extent the obligation which devolves on Great Britain of assisting her Colonies to defend themselves against foreign enemies, we maintain also that this obligation is discharged by doing or offering to do so on fair and liberal conditions, and that she is by no means bound to relieve them of the whole responsibility of self-defence. It must be borne in mind, that the interests of the Colonists in repelling aggression upon them is primary and direct; that of Great Britain indirect and secondary. While, therefore, it seems right that the Colonists should, as a rule decide on the extent and nature of their own defences, and have generally the control and management of them, it is unjust to throw the whole burden of expense on the less interested party.

In the second place, we submit that a system of defence, based upon the presence of Imperial garrisons, in every part of the empire, is as inefficient as it is burdensome; and that the right system would be one based on local efforts and local resources.

All history shows (what is indeed evident *à priori*) that the maintenance of dominion over scattered and distant territories depends either on the nature of the countries and their population, or upon the command of the sea. It is not physically possible, even if it were desirable, to maintain in fifty Colonies expensive fortifications and garrisons, adequate to stand regular sieges against powerful expeditions. With great efforts and at enormous expense, for what are supposed to be great objects, a few such garrisons are maintained out of Imperial resources at military posts, and with them we do not suggest any interference; at least they are calculated to effect the objects for which they are intended. But no nation could carry out such a system all over the world; no nation, in fact, has ever carried it so far as this country now does in the exceptional instance to which we have referred. The retention of the rest of our Colonies must depend not upon their garrisons, but upon the other means of defence which we have mentioned. The principal defence of such Colonies, so far as its depends upon the mother country at all, consists in her naval superiority; the real question as regards those which have no inherent powers of resistance being, not which power can first occupy the disputed ground, but which, on the whole; and in the end, can bring the greatest amount of force to bear upon it. For example, if we have 1,000 men in Jamaica or Trinidad, it is probable that we may lose them when the French or Americans can bring 2,000 or 3,000 to bear on them, and so on.

Colonial garrisons (when not very large, and in first-class fortresses,) have always found themselves in traps, and at the mercy of naval expeditions. Take the case of the Cape in the revolutionary war, when it had only 20,000 European inhabitants. For many years the Dutch had had a large garrison there, kept up at great expense, with a view, of course, to its defence in war. In 1795 a British expedition landed, and almost without resistance the garrison laid down its arms. We restored the Cape to the Dutch at the peace of Amiens, and, untaught by experience, they sent another garrison there. When the second war broke out the same thing happened, and we got a second batch of prisoners of war. In short, our fleets employed themselves during the first years of the war in sweeping up, as it were, into a net all the colonies belonging to all other nations in every part of the world, and making prisoners of their garrisons; and there is hardly a single instance where there was resistance worthy of the name. In the event of another war, if we retained the command of the sea, we could take Java, Martinique, and Guadeloupe, whenever we thought it worth while. On the other hand, we

should lose all our Colonies which do not possess natural and internal means of defence if we had for our antagonist a power or a combination of powers able to command the sea and desirous of taking them.

The condition, then, of a successful attack on any such Colony, would be either permanent command of the seas, or such a temporary command as would enable the enemy to land an expeditionary force powerful enough to conquer the country, and hold it against any subsequent attacks on our part. In neither of such contingencies would the present garrisons be capable of defence, especially as, with very few exceptions, the fortified places in these Colonies are so weak as to afford them hardly any protection; and accordingly, at every rumour of war, there comes from the Governor of every Colony a cry of distress, representing his unprotected state, and asking for reinforcements.

It is true these garrisons, though insufficient to stand regular sieges, may sometimes be able to repel what are called "insults," *i.e.*, aggression by flying squadrons or partisan bands. But such an object is not worth the expense of keeping up permanent garrisons in open towns. It is inconsistent with the practice of modern warfare to plunder private property, and the Government property at such places is hardly ever worth plundering. Indeed, fortifications and garrisons, unless really strong, are more likely to do harm than good, the towns being more likely to suffer in the engagement than if they were totally undefended. Besides, these are contingencies which local efforts should meet, both at home and abroad. The general Government has enough to do in providing for the defence of the country at its vital points. It is obviously incapable of protecting every commercial harbour and colonial capital. It is to be remembered that the question is one of comparative advantages and claims. Deducting the garrisons of the Mediterranean stations, and of the other Colonial possessions which are simply military posts, in 1857-58, about 27,000 regular troops were employed, and more than £2000,000 of money was spent on the military defence of the rest of the Colonies; and we cannot but feel convinced that those troops and that money might be more usefully employed, indeed more usefully for the Colonies themselves, because in a manner more conducive to the general security and welfare of the empire. There are between four and five thousand men, for example, scattered about, in detachments of a few companies each, in the West Indies; and yet there is not a post in the whole command which they could hold for a week against a hostile expedition. It seems to us clear that that number of soldiers would be far more serviceable to the empire if stationed in England, and that the cost of them, spent on sailors, would contribute more effectually to the defence of the West Indies themselves, than the present arrangement,

We have said that, so far as assistance from the mother country is concerned, the chief thing which most of our Colonies must look to for defence against foreign enemies is our navy. But a more efficient safeguard for most of them is to be found in their situation, and in the numbers and character of their population. Take, for example, the case of the provinces of British America, which are the only Colonies exposed to aggression by land. Of these the whole question of the successful defence depends on the wishes and feelings of the people themselves. If they were ill-affected, or even indifferent, no possible military efforts on our part could defend them in the case of war with America. On the other hand the Americans could never subdue and retain in subjection the British provinces, so long as the latter are determined not to accept their dominion. It is quite true that we could assist the Colonists very materially, but it is not necessary to keep up garrisons in time of peace for that purpose. No invasion of Canada by any power but the Americans is even conceivable; and no serious invasion of Canada by the Americans can be made without many months of preparation. They have no machinery or organisation for such an enterprise; while in much shorter time we could send troops there, if we wished it and could spare them. Against incursions by "fillibusters" or "sympathisers," the Canadians ought to be, and are, quite able to protect themselves. Indeed, it is a remarkable fact, that no colony having more than 20,000 European inhabitants has ever been conquered by a foreign enemy, except in the single instance of Canada itself, of which the population, at the time of its conquest, was 60,000; but which was in the singularly unfavourable position of being the only French colony in that part of the world, and attacked, therefore, not only from the seaward, by a power superior at sea, but by a warlike population of British colonists on its land frontier.

We repeat, then, that the real and sufficient protection to the independence of our Colonies consists, either first, in their remote and insulated positions, which make it highly improbable that any power could or would organise naval and military expeditions sufficiently powerful to take and keep them; or, secondly, in local circumstances, such as the nature of the country and the character and numbers of the population, which render it practically impossible to invade and conquer them, at any rate before assistance would arrive from this country. The West Indian Islands come under the first category; British North America under the second; Australia, New Zealand, Tasmania, and the Cape under both.

We have said enough to explain and illustrate the proposition which we began by laying down, viz., that it is not necessary or desirable for the interests of the empire generally, nor in reality of the Colonies themselves, to undertake their defence by small and scattered Imperial garrisons. We now come to practical recommendations. Two plans only have suggested themselves for obtaining from the Colonies a reasonable contribution towards their military defence.

One is the extension to all the Colonies of an arrangement made by Lord Grey (and modified by Mr. Labouchere) with New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia. By that arrangement it was provided that the Imperial Government should maintain in each of the Colonies referred to such a body of troops as it considered to be, in Mr. Labouchere's words, "sufficient for Imperial purposes," and that the Colonies should pay for all military buildings and other local defences, as well as for any troops beyond the force above specified, which they might ask for and obtain.

This arrangement has undoubtedly many advantages, and, as regards the Colonies in question, it has been very favourable to the British Exchequer, inasmuch as they pay by far the larger proportion of their military expenses. Nevertheless, we do not recommend it for general adoption, for several seasons. In the first place, we do not consider that the basis on which it rests is sound. We think, on grounds which we have already and fully explained, that it is not desirable "for Imperial purposes" to scatter small garrisons, in open or ill-fortified places all over the world, to which the system in question practically tends. In New South Wales, the force decided upon as "necessary for Imperial purposes" is four companies of infantry; in Victoria, the same amount; and in South Australia one company. Whilst this dispersion is admitted to be very prejudicial to discipline and organisation, and to involve the necessity of a disproportionate staff, we believe the force thus disposed of is not so usefully employed "for Imperial purposes," as it might be at home. We believe Imperial interests to be best consulted by keeping garrisons only in places which are calculated to resist invading expeditions, and by making the garrisons in those places really efficient and adequate.

Secondly, we do not understand how any arrangement founded on these principles could be made equally applicable to the fluctuating circumstances of different periods, especially to peace and war. If it be held, for example, that four companies are necessary "for Imperial purposes" at Sydney in time of peace, it seems to follow that a larger number would be necessary in time of threatened war, and a larger still in time of actual hostilities; in short, that the number required would fluctuate in proportion to the danger; while, whenever the force was augmented or diminished, a fresh negotiation would have to be entered into for the purpose of determining the respective proportions in which the expense should be defrayed.

Thirdly, we dissent from the argument founded on joint interest. If England was considered bound to contribute towards the defence of her Colonies merely because she is interested in their defence, it might fairly be argued that the obligation is reciprocal, and that the Colonies, being deeply interested in the safety of England, ought to contribute systematically and habitually towards the defence of London and Portsmouth. But the ground on which we hold that England is bound to contribute towards the defence of her Colonies is, that the Imperial Government has the control of peace and war, and is therefore in honour and duty called upon to assist them in providing against the consequences of its policy.

Finally, we believe that if we take upon ourselves the initiative in the defence of our Colonies, by assigning to them garrisons, however small, those garrisons will be taken as symbols of our responsibility, and their presence will tend to perpetuate the main evil of the present system, namely, the dependence of the Colonies on the mother country for defence, and their neglect of local efforts.

Having come for these reasons to the conclusion that it is not desirable to confirm and extend the arrangement referred to, we submit, as the result of careful and anxious deliberation, the following plan for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government:—

We propose to divide the Colonies (so called) into two classes. The first class would consist of military posts, in which, for objects altogether independent of and distinct from the defence of the particular countries in which they are situated, the Imperial Government thinks it necessary to maintain garrisons—such as Malta, Gibraltar, Corfu, Bermuda, and a few more of similar character. So long as these posts are held at all, they should be adequately fortified and garrisoned; but we are of opinion that as the garrisons of them are maintained without reference to the wants and wishes of the inhabitants, they should be dealt with exceptionally, and not included in any general scheme of Colonial contribution.

The second class would comprise all the rest of the Colonies, that is, all those where troops

are stationed primarily, if not exclusively, for the defence of the lives, liberties, and properties of their inhabitants. We propose that, as regards these Colonies, the system of defence should be founded on two simple principles, colonial management, and joint contribution at a uniform rate. We propose that the Imperial Government should call upon each Colony to decide on the nature of its own defences, and the amount of its garrison, and should offer to assist it by bearing a share (say, half, or any other proportion which may be fixed), of the entire cost; specifying at the same time a maximum sum beyond which this country should not be called upon to contribute without a further agreement. It seems to us essential that this arrangement, if adopted at all, should be uniformly applied; in other words, that adhesion to it should be a *sine quâ non* of our incurring any expense in the defence of a Colony of the class now under consideration. If it were adopted, some Colonies might choose to form a militia or to have corps enlisted for local service, like *e.g.* the "Canadian Rifles." In these cases they would organise and pay their forces as they might think fit, and the Imperial contributions would be paid into the Colonial exchequer without further interference than would be necessary to satisfy ourselves that they were expended in accordance with the agreement. Other Colonies might prefer being garrisoned by troops of the line, and paying their fixed share of the entire expense of such troops. In these cases the Imperial Government would first consider whether it could spare them; and would assure itself that the number asked for was sufficient for its purpose, and not open to the objections which exist to small and scattered garrisons, and also that the force would be adequately provided for as regards pay, allowances, and barracks; and it would only send the troops in case of there being no objection on any of these grounds. It would also be necessary to have a clear understanding that all troops so sent would be at the disposal of the Imperial Government in case any emergency should require them to be withdrawn.

We find that a plan very similar to this was proposed by the Governor of New South Wales (Sir W. Denison), and his responsible advisers, to Her Majesty's Government, and supported by the Governor in an important Despatch, dated 14th August, 1856. The proposal of the Colonial Government was, "That whatever may be the mode in which the military force in a Colony may be raised and organised, the mother country and the Colony shall contribute towards its expense in equal proportions, and that the Government of the Colony should have the responsibility of determining the amount of that force, whether in peace or war." It goes on to offer, as part of the same arrangement, to bear exclusively the cost of keeping up all fortifications, barracks, and all military buildings, on condition that those then existing should be handed over to the Colony; thus accepting considerably more than half the annual cost of the whole military defence, and making the proportion of the respective contributions a varying one. In reply to this Despatch, Lord Stanley wrote (11 March 1858) in the following terms:—"This proposal has the great merit of simplicity, and of being calculated to dispense with minute changes of plan, and to obviate disputes. But as it would seem difficult to adopt it unless your further proposal were incorporated with it, that the Colony should possess, through the vote of its Legislature, the responsibility of determining the amount of force which should be maintained in it, both in peace and war, Her Majesty's Government, as at present advised, do not see in what manner the suggestions of the Colonial Government can be carried out without compromising the independent action of the central Government of the empire. If every Colony were to assert a voice in this matter, I do not see in what manner the general defensive arrangements of the empire could be conducted."

"Her Majesty's former advisers therefore came to the opinion (from which, as far as I have yet been able to consider the subject, I see no reason to dissent), that for the present it was better not to alter the present system."

It will be seen that the refusal of the Secretary of State to entertain the proposal was expressed in very qualified terms, and that it rested entirely on a single difficulty, which we cannot but think may be easily removed. It is, that if each Colony settled the amount of its military force, the general defensive arrangements of the empire might be interfered with, which we understand to mean that if a Colony had the right of fixing the amount of its garrison, it might ask for more troops than the mother country, having to consider the general defence of the empire, could spare. It appears to us that this difficulty may be obviated by retaining in the hands of the Imperial Government the power of deciding whether it could spare the troops asked for, and refusing them if it could not. Indeed, such a power must be a necessary incident of any arrangement, including that made by Lord Grey with the Australian Colonies; and under the one which we propose it would involve no hardship on the Colony, which would only pay its share of maintaining the troops which it actually got. India, which pays for all the troops we send her, only gets those which we can spare, and so it must be with every part of the empire. But, in fact, we feel confident that the difficulty would never arise. If the Colonies paid half, or any large proportion of the entire cost of the force we sent them, they would, in almost every case, reduce that force far below what we now maintain there, and trust to local efforts for defence.

There is one objection which is likely to be urged against our plan, which we think it better to notice by anticipation. We mean an objection to laying down a uniform rate of joint contribution. It may possibly be said that one Colony is more exposed to foreign aggression, or less able, through poverty or the nature of its population, to provide against it than another; and that we ought to apportion our aid to the wants of each, not to the amount of its own efforts. The objection in question is founded on a different view of the nature and ground of the obligations of the mother country from that which we entertain and have endeavoured to express. We consider those obligations to be founded on the peculiar relation between the mother country and the Colonies, by which the exclusive control over peace and war is vested in the former, and that relation, it is needless to observe, is uniform and common to every Colony in the empire; but it is not in accordance with possibility that we should equalise the natural advantages and disadvantages, whether in relation to military or civil affairs of the different Colonies respectively. Just as the richer and more favourably circumstanced among them are able to have more expensive and complete systems of civil administration, more highly paid officers, better schools, hospitals, and gaols, so it is natural and inevitable that they should have, if they please, more effective and costly defences. Poor nations, like poor individuals, must be content to be less well off than rich ones; and, as regards the particular disadvantage now in question, it is to be observed, that the poorer the Colony the less is the temptation to attack it. Practically, too, the difficulty of estimating the respective needs and resources of Colonies would be so great, that any system of defence, founded on such estimate, would lead to as much injustice, discontent, and unsettlement as that under which we now suffer; while the plan of apportioning our contributions to local efforts would have a direct tendency to effect our main and primary object, the encouragement of the latter.

It is almost needless to say, that while persuaded of the feasibility as well as of the advantages of the plan which we recommend, we are not insensible of the difficulties which Her Majesty's Government will meet with in applying it. Nor do we for a moment suppose that it can be brought into full operation at once by a circular Despatch followed by the withdrawal of Her Majesty's troops. If it be adopted at all, it should be carried out with undeviating impartiality and firmness, and the Colonies should be made to understand from the first that the decision of the Government on the subject is final and irreversible. But it should also be carried out considerably and with caution; the Colonies will require time to organise systems of local self-defence, and in the meanwhile they should not be deprived of the protection to which we have accustomed them, if it be clear that they have *bonâ fide* accepted the arrangement proposed, and are preparing to act upon it. We venture further to suggest that it would be wise and just to show the utmost liberality to them in making the preliminary arrangements. For example, the Imperial Government possesses in every Colony considerable and often very valuable property, which has been acquired and retained for the purposes of defence; when the responsibility of that defence is transferred to the Colonies, it is clearly right that the property should be transferred to them also. The same course might be pursued (though on different grounds) with respect to the armament of forts and batteries, and even to the stores which might happen to be on the spot, and appropriated to local purposes. In short, every possible pains should be taken to let the Colonies see that the course decided upon is adopted with a view to the permanent advantage of themselves as well as of the mother country, and that there is no wish on the part of the latter to drive what is called a hard bargain with them.

In conclusion, the principal advantages of the plan which we recommend are as follows:—It would involve a great saving to the Imperial Exchequer, not only through the direct contribution of the Colonies, but also, as above intimated, by the general reduction of Colonial garrisons which would inevitably follow. At the same time no inordinate burden would be imposed upon the Colonies, seeing that it would rest with themselves to determine the amount of their respective armaments.

It would be equally applicable to peace and war; a Colony finding itself exposed to danger, would increase its military force, either by asking us for more troops, or by local measures of defence, of which the mother country would bear its fixed share of the expense.

It would stimulate the patriotism, self-reliance, and military spirit of the Colonies, by throwing on them the responsibility of directing their own military affairs.

Above all, it would convey, in the most marked and emphatic way, the determination of the mother country, that the Colonies should be governed through and for their own people. It would show that we rely on their loyalty and attachment, and on nothing else; that we have no wish to preserve our connexion with them by force; and that, therefore, we regard not only without jealousy, but with sympathy and pride, the growth of their military strength, and the cultivation of that martial spirit which is their best defence. It is in this point of view particularly that we consider the question, whether, in the organization of Colonial Defences, the mother country or the Colonies should take the initiative (that is, whether we should defend—

them with their assistance, or they defend themselves with ours), to be of the utmost importance; to depend, in fact, upon whether one or other of two opposite views of colonial policy be deliberately adopted; and we emphatically repeat, that it is mainly with reference to these fundamental principles, and not to a calculation of how much money we can obtain from the Colonies, or save to Great Britain, that we recommend the plan proposed and explained in this Report.

One member of the Committee, Mr. Elliot, finding himself unable to agree in the whole of our Report, and consequently to sign it, has appended a Memorandum, explaining to what extent he differs from us, and his reasons for doing so.

24 January 1860.

GEO. A. HAMILTON.
JOHN ROBERT GODLEY.

MEMORANDUM.

Colonial Office, 28th January, 1860.

I GREATLY lament that I cannot join with my colleagues in their Report on the military expenditure in the Colonies. If we have not been able to agree upon every portion of our inquiries, it has not been for want of an unfailing cordiality in their pursuit, nor of a perfectly frank interchange of all our opinions and information. But the truth perhaps is, that the topics of the Report, involving as they do some of the deepest and most debatable points in the relations of Colonies to a mother country, could hardly be expected to command an undivided judgment. These are questions on which no doctrines have yet attained the rank of established principles, and on which different opinions will probably long prevail. I hope that this may somewhat alleviate my responsibility as an unwilling dissentient from part of the Report: for even had it been unanimous, these large and delicate questions could still never have been settled otherwise than by the direct examination and authority of the Queen's Government.

Considering the importance of the subject, and the number of years during which it has been my duty to watch colonial affairs, I hope I may not err in believing it right to lay before Her Majesty's Government, for which they may be worth, the grounds of my dissent, and the nature of the opinions which I should have been prepared to submit.

Three main principles appear to me to be laid down in the Report; first, that we cannot expect our colonial possessions to be made defensible at all points, and at all times; secondly, that some few posts, especially valuable for Imperial purposes, should be dealt with exceptionally, and not included in any general scheme of colonial contribution; but, thirdly, that the whole remainder of our Colonies, without distinction or exception, ought to pay one uniform proportion of their military expenditure.

In the first of these propositions I cordially concur. No success in war, but rather disaster, would be likely to ensue from scattering the land forces of the empire over the numerous outlying possessions of a great maritime and colonising State, such as Great Britain. Her Colonial dominion rests on her naval supremacy. The mistress of the seas is mistress of whatever Colonies she pleases to hold or to take; and if ever she ceases to be mistress of the seas it is not forts or garrisons which will save her Colonies.

To that important section of the Report, in which these views are illustrated and enforced, I fully subscribe. It appears to me the more material, inasmuch as, should it meet with approval, it must discourage schemes of Colonial fortification, which I cannot help believing to be often extravagant. The Government offices are, at the present moment, full of such projects. I will take the liberty to quote two which have recently fallen within my own observation.

When the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of Austria went to war in Italy, it was immediately proposed that we should construct new batteries at the Cape of Good Hope, demanding a large additional garrison. The particulars appear in the Report. This was a proposal to strengthen England in the event of her being involved in a European war, by locking up, in addition to the present force, 800 artillerymen, and four regiments of the line, at the furthest extremity of South Africa.

The different channels through the Bahamas form considerable outlets from the Gulf of Mexico, and in time of war commerce will be liable to suffer in them from the cruisers of any hostile naval power. This is a motive for endeavouring to keep, as far as other claims will admit, a naval superiority in that region; but the islands themselves are of no value. We must not for a moment be misled by the importance of the situation; for, though important on the water, it is not important on land. And, if a new plan of fortification be proposed, the single test of its merit must be whether it will protect a rendezvous useful to the Queen's vessels in time of war. Now we are told, for reasons which I do not question, that New Providence is the only one of these islands at which the idea of building fresh works could be entertained, and a plan of such works has been submitted accordingly. But I find that the harbor of New Providence is contracted in extent, wanting in depth of water, and difficult of access. I cannot suppose, then, that for the high-sounding, but inapplicable reason, of its being a commanding site on the globe, we ought to be led into adopting a plan to expend £85,000, to plant 120 guns, and to detain at a remote place a company of artillery and a whole regiment of infantry, in order to watch over a narrow basin obstructed by a bar.

In these remarks, I am not so presuming or unjust as to impugn the merits of the officers by whom the projects have been prepared. If called upon for plans of land defences, they must furnish such plans; and I doubt not that they have drawn them with the best professional skill. What I am desirous to submit is, that such extensive land defences are in themselves inappropriate and unadvisable.

The second proposition states that the military posts are exceptional, but does not state whether it is meant that they ought to be exempt from contribution. On this point, however, an expression of opinion seems to me desirable, and I will venture to offer one. All of the following appear to me places, which, irrespective of any intrinsic value as Colonies, may be deemed stations important to the general strength of the empire:—

The Mediterranean Possessions.
Mauritius.
Ceylon.
Hong Kong.
Cape of Good Hope.
Bermuda.
St. Helena.

In the year 1857 these places contributed the following sums towards their military expenses:—

	£
Malta - - - - -	6237
Ionian Islands - - - - -	19,000
Mauritius - - - - -	17,725
Ceylon - - - - -	74,359
Hong Kong - - - - -	Nil.
Cape - - - - -	34,403
Bermuda - - - - -	Nil.
St. Helena - - - - -	625
	<hr/>
	£152,419

My opinion is, that we are not called upon to strike off this class of receipts from the British Exchequer. There appears to me no injustice in accepting a contribution from such of these places as contain prosperous communities, so long as the amount falls short of the cost of the number of troops which they would require for their own purposes. Mauritius, for instance, is one of the most flourishing Colonies which we possess, tenanted by an immense fluctuating population of coloured labourers of various races. There seems to be no good reason why this wealthy island should not contribute, as it does, a moderate quota towards the expense of troops which are indispensable to its internal security.

From the third proposition I am compelled to differ. I cannot think that the same fixed proportion ought to be contributed by all Colonies whatsoever, regardless of their inherent differences.

Suppose that some of the richer Colonies, such as those in Australia, particularly require troops, and are willing to contribute two-thirds of the expense, must we reject the offer if others contribute only one-half? Or, again, suppose that some of the minor Colonies urgently need troops, but are unable to contribute more than a quarter of their expense, must we either refuse the troops, or reject the contribution, merely because other Colonies pay more?

Uniformity is good, where circumstances are uniform ; but where they differ it seems to me reasonable that practice should differ also ; and, as to the equity of the matter, surely it is quite as unjust to apply a uniform rule to different cases, as to apply a varying rule to cases which are alike.

Now nothing can be more diversified, and especially more unequal, than the condition of the British Colonies ; they are exposed, some more, some less, to foreign invasion ; some more and others less to perils from natives ; the population in one kind of Colonies is dense, in another scattered, in some it is peaceful, in others troublesome, and in a few it sprang from convicts sent out for the convenience of this country. Again, in certain Colonies this population is British, in others Foreign ; in part of them it is wholly white, in part almost wholly coloured, and in many it consists of a large proportion of both ; above all, some are rich and some are poor. Is it surprising with Colonies of such an infinite variety of condition that both their demands for military assistance should be different, and their powers of contribution unequal ?

We are bound, it is said, to equalise their advantages and disadvantages ; poor nations, like poor individuals, must be content to be less well off than rich ones. This is perfectly true ; but then the Colonies, especially the lesser Colonies, which most call for assistance, are not separate nations ; they are members of one immensely powerful and wealthy nation, from which they believe that they are entitled to some share of general protection. The question is what that share should be.

The Report admits, in handsome terms, the claim of the Colonies to receive aid in their defence, but rests it solely on the ground that the Imperial Government has the control of peace or war, and is, therefore, bound in honour to assist in guarding others from suffering by its policy. I cannot think that this is the only ground, and that we must discard that of interest. Suppose that one of our Colonies should yield the long-desired advantage of a field for the supply of cotton, would not England have a direct interest in its defence, even though it did not contribute a shilling or a man towards the struggle of a European war ? Nor is it necessary to take only an imaginary illustration. Australia, in the latest year reported, sent into this country imports to the value of nearly fifteen millions, and received from it exports of thirteen millions, of which more than eleven were of home produce. Would there not be an interest in defending the countries which afford such a trade as this, even though the assistance is not reciprocal, and though they lend no direct aid to the defence of Portsmouth or of London ? If it is said that the trade would exist at all events, I reply that the exports received from us by Australia, compared with its population, are at the rate of nearly twelve pounds a head, whilst the exports received from us by the United States are at the rate of less than one. The figures are appended in a table. They show how much larger, in proportion, is the commerce with countries which remain part of the empire. Nor can it be maintained that this striking difference is accidental ; it is the natural result, which would occur in any similar case, of unfavourable tariffs on the one hand, and of the habit, on the other hand, of resorting to a particular market. This last influence is by no means to be undervalued. It will be found as a matter of fact, that an English Colony, having all its correspondence with England, leans to the use of English supplies.

Without dwelling further, however, on abstract discussions, it may be more fruitful of practical consequences to examine a little more closely some of the facts in the Colonies which bear on their military requirements. For this purpose the Colonies may, perhaps, be roughly divided into the following classes :—

1st. Great and unmixed European communities, such as those in British North America and in Australia.

2nd. European communities which are large and thriving, but in contact with powerful and warlike natives, such as the Colonies of New Zealand and the Cape of Good Hope.

3rd. Limited numbers of European planters and settlers, situated in the midst of large coloured populations, such as the West Indies and the Eastern Colonies.

4th. Mere handfuls of white functionaries and merchants dwelling in the midst of overwhelming numbers of black races, both subject and independent, such as the Colonies on the Western Coast of Africa.

I think it will be seen at a glance, that it would be difficult to frame any general rule which should be equally applicable to all of such dissimilar societies. It seems to me very doubtful whether they ought, on account of any abstract principle or for mere convenience, to contribute equally to their military expenditure ; it is certain that they could not do so in point of fact. If we lay down any rate of contribution which may be equitable for the first or the second of the above classes, and say that the West Indies must either pay the same or else part with the troops, we may as well send the order for their return to-morrow. We know perfectly well that

most of those impoverished Colonies cannot find the money. The question then is, whether there is anything in the presence of troops there so essential to the fundamental wants of society that, in default of local resources, the ruling authority is bound to supply the demand. I freely admit that poorer communities will have inferior roads and landing places, schools, gaols, and hospitals, and that the deficiency is not to be supplied from the Imperial purse. But if, in these islands, the very existence of society depends on having a small military force, may not the provision of it be fairly deemed a duty of the sovereign power? I do not believe that the Government or the people of this country would endure that any places should be called British, and yet fall into a state of helpless, and perhaps sanguinary anarchy.

And this compels me to a short digression on the ends and objects of a military force. I think that we must not assume that their use is to repel a foreign enemy alone; although this, undoubtedly, is their main use. But whilst I entirely agree that troops ought not to be employed in the ordinary duties of police, I cannot help thinking that in almost every country, respect for the civil force is secured by a knowledge that behind everything else there is a military array to be appealed to in the last resort. The functions of a police are to keep down crime, but it requires soldiers to suppress sedition. Another use, it appears to me, of a regular military force is to assert, by their very presence, the national rights of sovereignty. It is not the handful of soldiers on some particular spot that is material, but the fact that, just as much as the flag that flutters over their heads, they are the emblems of the national force, and that it is well known that any aggression on them will be resented with the whole force of the empire. A serjeant's guard is in this light a representative of the entire English army. In exposed parts of our dominions this may be an important consideration.

The views above submitted upon the West Indies apply, with slight modifications, to the settlements on the Western Coast of Africa. Those settlements are maintained for the sake of one of the most cherished objects of English policy. They are too puny to be able to defray even their civil expenditure without assistance from British funds. It appears certain, then, that they could not afford to pay for troops for themselves, whilst without troops it can hardly be supposed that they could subsist in the midst of lawless Europeans pursuing an almost piratical trade, and numerous warlike African tribes. Be this as it may, however, the real question for the Government must be, I apprehend, whether the troops can be reduced, or altogether discarded, but not whether these small settlements can pay any material proportion of their cost.

The foregoing are reasons for which, I think, that an equal rate of contribution from all Colonies is not just, expedient, or practicable, and that any efficient attempt to enforce it would be attended with the risk of serious misfortunes. I prefer the other plan by which Her Majesty's Government determines the amount of force which it deems it reasonable to allot to the different Colonies, at British charge, as being required by the duties of the Sovereign State, whilst the Colonies themselves must pay for any additional number of troops which they may ask for and obtain. One advantage of this plan is, that instead of requiring us to enter into a long and probably irritating negotiation with all the Colonies, it executes itself, and is settled from time to time by the direct authority of the Queen's Government. It adapts itself to the varying circumstances of the several Colonies. And as regards the two most important collections of them, it is already in operation with the concurrence of their inhabitants. With these remarks, I propose, in the remainder of this paper, to review briefly the principal groups of Colonies, and to show how far this rule already applies.

NORTH AMERICAN PROVINCES.

THESE great countries contain three millions of people, and are for thousands of miles conterminous with the United States. It is evident that no forces sent from home can be supposed to undertake the defence of this vast line of territory. The security of the inhabitants rests chiefly on their own patriotism and valour, of which they have already, whenever required, afforded brilliant and successful examples. The principle was propounded by Earl Grey in 1851, and was repeated by the Duke of Newcastle, as Secretary for War, and Sir George Grey, as Colonial Secretary in 1854, that in Canada the fortified city of Quebec, and the fort of Kingston, with perhaps one or two outlying posts between Montreal and the frontier, should be garrisoned by the general troops of the empire, but that no more ought to devolve on the general Government. This proposition was acquiesced in by the authorities of Canada without a murmur, and they have set about active measures, at a considerable charge to themselves, for rendering their militia efficient. The harbour of Halifax is as much a station important to the general power of the nation as any of the places which have been enumerated in the list of military posts. It is only just that its garrison should be provided for out of Imperial funds; nor could the province of Nova Scotia, which is far from wealthy, be expected to tax itself for such a purpose, merely because this valuable Imperial post happens to be situated within its limits. Small parties of troops are at present stationed at the seats of

Government in Canada, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland. How far there may be sufficient motives to maintain these in connection with Her Majesty's representatives, and as marks of the common tie which unites the empire, as well as what amount of inconvenience such detachments may occasion in the detail of military duty, are questions for the judgment of Her Majesty's Government. But, with this exception, it seems to be understood that this country is only to garrison the forts, and that for any additional force the provinces are to rely on themselves. If this view has not yet been carried into full effect, the time and mode of doing it must depend on the discretion of Her Majesty's Government.

AUSTRALIAN COLONIES.

In this group, and although dwelling in different Colonies, yet the majority of them in close neighbourhood, there are now no less than one million of settlers. It is needless to say that they can be in danger of subjugation. That European power would be very strong which undertook to conquer a million of Englishmen living at the antipodes. But they very properly desire to protect themselves against partial descents, and injury to their homes and property, and since the rumours of European wars they have shown great ardour and resolution on the subject. It would be the greatest mistake, in my opinion, to doubt the spirit and self-reliance of any of our large European settlements.

In the Australian Colonies the principle has been laid down that, after fixing a number of troops to be assumed as the quota required for Imperial purposes, all additional force sought for by the local governments should be paid for (provided that this country can spare them) by the Colonies themselves. Accordingly, four companies have been assigned to New South Wales and four to Victoria, and those Colonies are to pay for the whole of the expense beyond that strength. South Australia has just asked for troops, and has been apprised that it must submit to the same rule, which there seems no reason to expect that it will dispute. Tasmania does not pay, because it still comprises a large population of convict origin, and it has been thought fair that its security should be provided for at the Imperial charge. For how long a time and to what extent this ground should continue to be admitted will be practical questions, on the recurrence of each successive year, for the discretion of Her Majesty's advisers. In Western Australia there are only a company of the line, part of a company of Sappers, and a few enrolled pensioners, employed to guard English convicts.

NEW ZEALAND.

SETTING aside convict settlements, this is the only Colony connected with the Australian group to which the principle has not been applied that an English quota being fixed, all additional troops are to be defrayed from local sources. New Zealand has hitherto been less wealthy than the others, and is in peculiar circumstances on account of its aboriginal inhabitants. The proportion of Europeans to Maories is, however, continually increasing, and the longer that our rule is maintained in tranquillity, the more must the natives be supposed to become confirmed in habits of peace and order. This would be a reason for reducing the Imperial garrison, and for entrusting the security of the European inhabitants chiefly to their own prudence and justice in dealing with the natives in time of quiet, and to their spirit in case of disturbance. On the other hand, if a premature or excessive diminution of troops should be followed by disaster to our countrymen in New Zealand, public opinion would probably condemn the measure. Between these conflicting considerations, it appears to me to be the task of statesmen to divine the course which may be best suited to the circumstances of the time at which they have to form their decision.

THE MEDITERRANEAN DEPENDENCIES.

THESE speak for themselves; they are garrisoned for Imperial purposes. The Ionian Islands are bound by convention, executed under the Treaty of Paris, to contribute a yearly sum of £25,000 towards their military expenses, and Malta contributes a sum of £6,200.

THE WEST INDIES.

ON this group I have stated by anticipation some of the general views which seem to me to deserve consideration. The West Indian Colonies are divided into two military commands: first, Jamaica, and secondly, the Windward and Leeward Islands. Jamaica must, I apprehend, be admitted as falling more or less within the category of places of which the occupation conduces to the general strength of the empire abroad. The regular troops in it ought, doubtless, to be reduced within the smallest compass which Her Majesty's Government, assisted by professional advisers, may consider compatible with safety; but so long as a Colonial system is upheld at all, I should think it could not be denied that this great Island ought to be the

seat of some Imperial force, maintained at the national charge. In the Windward and Leeward Islands I quite admit that the troops ought not to be scattered about for purposes of police, but I think that there ought to be some small central force sufficient to protect any arsenals that we possess in this region, and also to be moved in case of need to any scene of insurrection or civil disturbance.

EASTERN COLONIES.

CEYLON appears to have contained, in 1857, about 2,386 troops. The War Office Return appended to the Report exhibits the charges at home for the troops serving in the Colonies, including a proportion of the whole dead weight of the British army, the cost of transport, and the military expenditure on the spot. This last amounted, for Ceylon, in 1857, to £137,776, of which the Colony paid £74,359, or an ample half. Whether it should be required to increase this contribution must be a question for Her Majesty's Government. This Colony at present is spending large sums on railways and other reproductive works. The more, of course, that it may be judged proper to take for military purposes, the less will remain for those other objects which promote the development of wealth.

MAURITIUS.—The force in 1857 was 850, the military expenditure on the spot £74,215; the contribution of the Colony, £17,795, which has since been increased. The island could probably afford more, and if symmetry be thought a desirable object, when practicable, this Colony might be able to contribute, as Ceylon has done, a sum equal to about half the cost on the spot of providing for its defence and internal security.

HONG KONG.—The force in 1857 was 826; the expenditure on the spot £67,180. This Colony has only recently been able to defray its civil expenditure, it has contributed nothing towards its military expenditure; and I suppose that the garrison will always be within the limit of the amount deemed indispensable for general national objects.

WESTERN COAST OF AFRICA.

ON the settlements in this part of the world I have submitted at an earlier stage some general observations. The force in 1857 was 1,012; the expenditure on the spot was £58,946, of which £699 was locally contributed. It would certainly appear desirable that the forces on this coast should be kept within the smallest amount consistent with the objects for which they are employed. Whether they can be reduced, and to what extent, is a military question, that can only be dealt with by the Government, with the aid of such military advice as it may deem it necessary to take.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

ONE considerable Colony alone has not been noticed in the preceding review, and that is the Cape of Good Hope. At this place we maintain, not a garrison, but rather an army. The average force for five years would seem by Parliamentary Returns to have been 7,000 and in 1857 it is reported by the War Office at upwards of 10,000. Exclusive of all home charges, and of the cost of transport, the military expenditure of 1857 is returned at £649,878, being nearly two-thirds of a million. In the same year was voted one of a series of annual grants of £40,000, for civilising the Kaffirs, and averting disputes with the natives. It is true that these efforts have given us the satisfaction of being able to say that we have not had a Kaffir war, but nine or ten thousand troops constitute such an army as England seldom has to spare for less favored spots. The direct objects of Imperial concern at the Cape, in a military point of view, are the harbours of Table Bay and Simon's Bay. The subjoined Table will exhibit some of its leading statistics:—

	Population.	Imports into the Colony.	Exports from the Colony.	Amount of Military Force.	Direct Military Expenditure in the Colonies themselves.*
Cape - - - -	267,096	£ 2,637,192	£ 1,988,406	£ 10,759	£ 649,878
All other Colonies -	7,615,575	56,452,628	48,052,055	36,492	2,325,994
TOTAL - -	7,882,671	59,089,820	50,040,461	47,251	2,975,872

* This is exclusive of recruiting and all other charges at home; of any assumed charge for a proportion of the general dead weight of the army, and is also exclusive of the cost of transport. The returns of population, imports, and exports are taken from the latest Blue Books.

It is for Her Majesty's Government to determine the relative claims of different parts of the empire to the assistance of the mother country ; but supposing that some reduction of the military expenditure abroad is judged indispensable, it seems a grave fact that a Colony of which the population is one twenty-ninth of the whole population of the British Colonies, and of which the imports and exports are respectively one twenty-second and one twenty-fifth, absorbs more than one-tifth of the whole force allotted to the Colonies, and occasions more than a fourth of the whole direct military expenditure. If we were to omit the Mediterranean garrison, which evidently are a special class, it would be found that the Cape contained in 1857 one-third of the whole force in the Colonies, and occasioned nearly one-third of the direct military expenditure.

One remark is essential on this Colony. It is commonly said that the Colonists would be willing enough to undertake their own protection provided that they might deal with the Kaffirs as they themselves consider best, but that this would entail a mode of warfare which would not be tolerated by public opinion in England. On the other hand, so long as British authority restrains the settlers from defending themselves in their own way, it is bound to find some efficient substitute. The result has been to produce an excessive drain of British resources for a single Colony ; the expenditure, as above shown, is enormous, and it is not likely ever to be materially reduced except by a radical change of policy. Such a change would relieve the country from a heavy burthen, and, so far as concerns the demands both for men and money, would be a palpable gain. Whether it would be opposed to any just claims of philanthropy, or to the general duties of sovereign States towards their subjects, and whether also it would be irreconcilable with public opinion, are questions of a different kind, lying beyond our province. They can only be determined by statesmen engaged in the actual conduct of affairs.

This completes a review of the principal groups of the Colonies. The following results may, I think, be drawn from it :—

First. That in British North America and Australia, being the chief assemblages of European communities, a general and intelligible principle about military expenditure is already established.

Secondly. That in the West Indies and on the Coast of Africa the Colonies can neither pay towards the cost of troops, nor yet exist without them ; and hence that if such possessions are to be maintained at all, the only question for Government must be what is the smallest force which will answer its purpose.

Thirdly. That it is quite fair that the richer tropical settlements should contribute towards the expense of their garrisons, but that Ceylon and Mauritius are for the present the only Colonies which come within this category, and that both of these may perhaps, if it is thought of importance, be treated alike.

Fourthly. That the most difficult questions must arise with regard to large European settlements in contact with warlike neighbours, such as New Zealand and the Cape, but that each of these again must be dealt with according to its own conditions ; the chief of which have been above stated.

I think that the contribution should always be in money and not in kind, such as rations, stores, or barrack accommodation. This plan is shown by former examples to be unsatisfactory and a fertile source of dispute.

Even if the contribution be calculated as a proportion of the whole military expenditure, I think that the amount should be fixed for periods of some continuance, since practical inconvenience and occasions of difference would arise from its constant fluctuation.

I cannot agree that the defences ought to be placed generally and as a system under local management. In the first place, the subject does not admit of being conveniently treated in detached portions ; military and naval operations, and the preparations to be made for them, require an extended survey. In the next place, the welfare of the Queen's troops in time of peace, and the provision to be made for the success of the national arms in time of war, appear to me precisely examples of the subjects for which the Imperial Government must remain responsible, and which ought to be dealt with by the authority of the Governor, as Her Majesty's representative, and of the Officer commanding the forces.

In conclusion, I must express my regret for the length of this examination of the different Colonies, but it seemed to me that the true nature of the difficulties to be met could not be shown by any shorter process. What has to be solved is not one problem, but many. I despair of discovering upon them any self-acting rule which shall be a substitute for the judg-

ment and firmness of the Ministers of the Crown for the time being. They will doubtless always be guided by a policy, but they can hardly expect to despatch such complicated and arduous questions by a single maxim. To deal with cases on their merits, to labour patiently against opposition in some quarters, and to welcome and reciprocate co-operation from others ; these, in so wide and diversified a sphere as the British Colonies, appear to me tasks and duties inseparable from the function of governing, which can never be superseded by the machinery of a system however ably conceived or logically constructed.

T. FREDERICK ELLIOT.

APPENDIX.

POPULATION, IMPORTS, and EXPORTS of the under-mentioned Countries for the Year 1857.

	Population.	Imports into the United Kingdom.	Exports from the United Kingdom.		
			Home Produce.	Colonial and Foreign Produce.	TOTAL.
		£	£	£	£
British America	3,014,051	6,399,110	4,329,035	339,325	4,668,360
Australia	1,107,537	14,991,594	11,632,524	1,542,601	13,175,125
United States	27,797,403	33,647,227	18,985,939	1,090,956	20,076,895
TOTAL	31,918,991	55,037,931	34,947,498	2,972,882	37,920,380

The Imports and Exports are compiled from the Returns of the Board of Trade; the Population of the Colonies from the Blue Books; and of the United States from the Almanac published in 1858.