2003 (No. 11)

2003

PARLIAMENT OF TASMANIA

PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS

PRISONS INFRASTRUCTURE REDEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, STAGE C

Presented to His Excellency the Governor pursuant to the provisions of the Public Works Committee Act 1914.

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL	HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY
Mr *Harriss* (Chairman)	Mr *Best*
Mr *Hall*	Ms *Hay*
	Mrs *Napier*

By Authority: Government Printer, Tasmania

00000

INTRODUCTION

To His Excellency the Honourable Sir Guy Stephen Montague Green, Companion of the Order of Australia, Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Governor in and over the State of Tasmania and its Dependencies in the Commonwealth of Australia.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY

The Committee has investigated the following proposal: -

PRISONS INFRASTRUCTURE REDEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, STAGE C

and now has the honour to present the Report to Your Excellency in accordance with the *Public Works Committee Act 1914*.

BACKGROUND

The Current Situation

Maximum, Medium and Minimum Security Classifications Defined

In Tasmania there are 3 levels of security classification, maximum, medium and minimum, that are applied to prisoners, with distinct levels and regimes of security applied according to each such classification.

Maximum Security

Prisoners/detainees classified as maximum security are subject to high levels of supervision in an environment that provides for direct and coercive intervention, if required, to maintain safety, security and good order. Prisoners/detainees are detained within substantial physical barriers with the capability of armed intervention if escape is attempted. They would normally always remain within the secure perimeter, but if required to leave prison property, they are escorted and restrained as appropriate. In the proposed accommodation model, maximum security prisoners/detainees would be accommodated in cell blocks, and would be locked in their cells within these secure units overnight.

Medium Security

Prisoners classified medium security are detained in locked accommodation overnight. In the proposed accommodation model, medium security prisoners/detainees would be accommodated in medium security units, within the perimeter of the prison.

Minimum Security

During the day, prisoners are required to be subject to occasional supervision and are given clear directions by staff as to their proper location. They are required to report to a designated place by a designated time.

In the proposed accommodation model, minimum security prisoners/detainees would be accommodated in minimum security units.

Current Facilities in Southern Tasmania

Putting this policy into effect in prison operations in Tasmania has been limited by the physical structures and layout of the prison facilities. Whilst at the time (1950's) they were highly regarded, particularly the cell accommodation, they now impede contemporary correctional practice.

Risdon

This is a predominantly maximum security facility built in an era when there was little emphasis on any positive interaction between custodians and inmates, and little attempt to provide programs which address the offending behaviour of inmates. It has the following major limitations:

- very limited shared indoor living areas;
- no indoor, passive recreation space in the accommodation divisions;
- very limited visits facilities;
- program spaces which are restricted and difficult to access;
- limited open space within the perimeter;
- physical barriers and manually operated gates requiring staff intensive movement control;
- a single central ablution area some distance from the accommodation units;
- dining rooms separate from the accommodation units;
- facilities for staff are very limited
- the design of the accommodation units restricts interaction of staff and prisoners; and
- the buildings, which are forty years old, have been poorly maintained and are significantly deteriorated.

Hayes

The minimum security farm at Hayes has always operated with minimal "static" security in the form of physical barriers, and relies on appropriate selection of inmates who can be trusted, and the "dynamic" security of staff detecting when inmates become a security risk, e.g. as a result of upsetting news from home.

This facility is an appropriate one for minimum security prisoners, but its facilities for staff and inmates are quite restricted (particularly the cell blocks) and are generally in poor condition.

Ron Barwick Medium Security

This small facility, [35 capacity] was built in the 1980's at Risdon and located outside the maximum security perimeter. It was built to offer a progression from maximum security, theoretically as a staging towards transfer to minimum security conditions at Hayes. It's limitations are:

- it has little indoor recreation and program space, and restricted indoor living areas and;
- it has no space for industry which could be run separately from the maximum security industries.

This has meant that over the years, it has effectively operated as minimum security. Inmates are currently allowed outside the facility only to work around the prison property or otherwise be under supervision. The majority of inmates at Ron Barwick are minimum security classified.

Hobart Remand Centre

The most recent example in Tasmania of the desired type of staff and inmate environment is the Hobart Remand Centre. Commissioned in 1999, this Centre has been very successfully run on the basis of smaller units and more positive interaction of staff with inmates, and between inmates. The limitation in this facility is the very rapid turnover of remandees through the Centre, which to some extent, works against the development of the normalised environment which is the ideal. Limitations exist in relation to program spaces and exercise areas, and the multi-storey arrangement of the facility does not promote efficient movement control.

Overall Situation

In summary, a large proportion of inmates – 80% approximately- are housed in maximum security conditions, and the system has limited regimes of management for inmates of lower classifications.

In recent years, some progress has been made to overcome the limitations of the environment. The adaptations to A Division at Risdon, in 1997, achieved something of the desired type of environment by at least allowing for inmates in that area to be responsible for meals preparation, and providing a reasonable enclosed living area within the unit. Improvements have also been made to the working conditions for staff in certain areas although these have been constrained by the age of the facility and the limited space available.

Recent Trends in Prison Design

The general approach to prison configuration in recent times is what is known as a "campus" style design. The essential element of such design is the enclosing of a larger space within a very secure perimeter fence, within which a number of zones can be established.

Prisoner accommodation

A number of largely self-contained accommodation units provide housing for inmates of all classifications. Accommodation units for higher security prisoners and for groups requiring separation or protection, are fenced to create zones in which prisoner movement can be controlled, enhancing the safety and security of the prison environment.

Prisoner services zone

This zone incorporates buildings which provide for shared services such as health, education, program activities, workshops, active recreation and prisoner visits. These buildings are located in such a way that they can be accessed by inmates from different units within the complex, with movement able to be controlled so that where necessary, inmates can be kept apart.

Buildings in this zone are also located in such a way that visitors to the complex are able to obtain access from outside the prison through an area in which prisoner movement is controlled.

The campus design is supported by extensive use of security and other technology. Prisoner movement is managed far more efficiently and cost effectively through the use of remotely operated electronic locks coupled with video surveillance, and/or other methods of movement control such as the use of "smart card" technology.

Having a range of accommodation options within the complex also provides an incentive for inmates to be encouraged to move to areas where they take more direct responsibility for their units and in such things as meals preparation, which assists in their preparation for release. Experience in many prisons which operate such systems has shown the benefits of this approach, not only in facilitating rehabilitation, but in the way in which the facilities are looked after and the general atmosphere of the prison. It also recognises that while inmates may be classified as maximum security because of the length of time they still have to serve, their behaviour may warrant them moving to the type of accommodation where they can be somewhat more independent, and prison design and facilities should allow for this to occur.

The Model for Tasmania

Functional Arrangement

One of the complexities facing Tasmania is the requirement to accommodate all the differing groups requiring separate management within a system whose overall size doesn't justify separate specialist facilities. Even if the option of one larger prison to replace Risdon and Hayes is ultimately pursued, the size of the 500 bed prison that would be required would still be smaller than the 600 plus size which is considered optimum for cost effective construction and operation. The requirement to accommodate all persons, male and female, at the one site, from the watch-house stage, through remand, to serving out the sentence imposed is not common, but is

being incorporated in other States in certain regional locations. The concept of an all-purpose, generalist style of prison, such as is proposed at Risdon is supported by the experience of those jurisdictions.

The recommended concept of prison design for Tasmania, recognising these multiple demands, will thus have some accommodation outside the perimeter, and a range of accommodation units inside housing the majority of the prison population. Static security would be primarily provided by the perimeter fence, allowing for a more cost effective and productive layout within this perimeter.

The accommodation units inside the fence will be of 3 basic types:

- cell blocks for the majority of maximum security inmates;
- medium security units of 6 cells which would provide the option and incentive of more independent living for the majority of medium security inmates; and
- minimum security units, each with 2 wings and 6 bedrooms per wing, for any inmates who have progressed to minimum security classification.

Although the concept provides for three different types of accommodation, with the cell blocks the most heavily constructed and internally secure, all the inmates inside are securely contained by the same maximum security perimeter. The model provides more flexibility in internal management with greater security.

To achieve the greatest efficiencies, inmates with a low security requirement, immediately prior to their release, would be housed outside the secure perimeter fence, either at Hayes or at the redeveloped Risdon site. Although low security, the accommodation would be within an alarmed barrier fence to provide warning of people attempting to enter or leave the area. Locating them in this way recognises that they are inmates who have either very short sentences to serve or who are close to release and who are being prepared for return to the community. It also serves to minimise the interaction between these inmates, many of whom would be going out into the community performing community service work or to participate in training or education programs, and the maximum and medium security inmates housed inside the prison perimeter.

Another feature of the Tasmanian system which must be accommodated, is the extent of fluctuation which is experienced in prisoner numbers. Because of this, and the overall small numbers in particular categories of inmates, there is a need to design in the maximum degree of flexibility within the accommodation units so that the facility can be adapted to cater for varying requirements over time.

The general arrangement and inter-relationships of the various prison facilities are detailed below.

Maximum Security Cell Blocks

The cell block units would vary in size from 10 to 26 cells, each of which would include shower and toilet facilities. These blocks would generally be equipped for light meals preparation and personal laundering, and would have indoor passive

recreation and living space as well as access to enclosed outdoor space for greater degrees of separation.

Medium Security Units

These smaller units would have 6 individual single cells. They would be self-contained for light meals preparation and laundering, which would be the responsibility of inmates in that unit. Inmates would normally be locked in their unit overnight, and their security would be managed through electronic systems.

Minimum Security Units

The minimum security units would have 2 wings of 6 bedrooms each, with shared living, kitchen, ablution and laundry facilities. Inmates would be totally responsible for meals preparation and for the care and maintenance of the unit. They would be locked into the unit at night but have freedom of movement within.

The provision of these sizes and types of largely self-contained units has the advantage of giving prison management better capacity to separate inmates within the accommodation zones.

Prisoner Services Zone

Facilities for health services, education, active recreation, industries and programs would be provided in such a way that they can be accessed by prisoners from any part of a prison complex, with that access able to be controlled. This need for access also applies to the separate prison facilities (Women's Prison and the converted existing prison), so that inmates to these facilities have a similar range of options available to them.

Demand Considerations

Demand Analysis

During Stage B of the PIRP consultant John Walker, a respected criminologist then based in Canberra, prepared forecasts for the prisons population of Tasmania and predicted 1381 receptions to Tasmanian prisons in 2001-02 and 1378 in 2002-03. Mr Walker also predicted a maximum of 478 prisoners in 2002-03, and a peak of 508 in 2005 (from a total of 20 years to 2019). A high population scenario (base +20%) put this figure at over 600 in early 2003, and as high as 625 over the period to 2007 as a result of seasonal fluctuations.

During the early planning phase of PIRP Stage C a social and demand analysis was undertaken by consultants Drs Elaine Stratford, Julie Davidson, Matt Bradshaw and Rob White from the University of Tasmania acting as private consultants to the Program.

The analysis was informed by other considerations, such as the site planning, stakeholder management, master planning and operational planning projects, and in

turn complemented these same projects. In the analysis emphasis was placed on developing scenarios for prisoner numbers and population characteristics and the related infrastructure implications of the same.

From the analysis the scenarios suggested that the annual prison population for Tasmania might have been be as little as 340 or as high as 480 by 2015, with a remand population as high as 81.

However it was emphasised that projections were highly sensitive to perturbations in political, policy and operational contexts, and that they could also be affected by a range of socio-demographic trends and criminogenic behaviours that differentially affect men and women, youths and adults, and people from different backgrounds. This volatility was demonstrated during 2002 by an unanticipated increase in the number of people in Tasmanian prisons, such that the daily count in October through early November was near 480. As a result of recent political discussions over the need for mandatory non-parole periods and the real possibility of these being set at 75 per cent of sentence, the consultants were requested to investigate the likely implications of such matters for prisoner numbers to the year 2007 and again to the year 2020. To indicate possible numbers at various non-parole periods from 55 to 80 per cent, a number of scenario projections were developed based on the Modified Walker Model and applying the ABS's three population projection series.

Using the highest population projection, Series I, and a non-parole period of 75 per cent, the prison population could expand up to 595 in late 2006. At 60 per cent non-parole, the population could be expected to be 542.

The current accommodation model for the PIRP has been developed based upon these revised projections. The table below sets out a prison system capacity of 712 accommodation beds, following the Stage C Project, including the existing facilities to be retained in the interim, the Hobart and Launceston Remand Centres and Hayes. However, the size and configuration of Tasmania's prison system over the next twenty years is predictable only to the extent that these other variables are also predictable, and may come to reside in the articulation of Government policy as much as they do in objective measurement.

Prison System capacity following Stage C Project	
Stage C new accommodation	281 beds
Existing facilities retained (interim)	295 beds
Hobart Remand Centre	40 beds
Launceston Remand Centre	28 beds
Hayes Prison Farm	68 beds
Total capacity	**712 beds**

Stage C Accommodation

The design of the facilities will make provision for a minimum 30% additional accommodation, in case future demand requires such an increase and Government provides the resources for such construction.

The accommodation to be provided in Stage C is scheduled in the table below:

Stage C Accommodation Facilities	Beds
MALE PRISONER ACCOMMODATION	
Maximum Security:	
Mainstream cell beds (2 x 26-bed units)	52
Protection cell beds (1 x 14-bed unit)	14
Behaviour Management cell beds	10
Needs Assessment cell beds	15
Sub-total	91
Medium Security (8 x 6-bed units, 8 x 8-bed units):	
Mainstream & Protection beds	88
Remand beds	24
Sub-total	112
FEMALE PRISONER ACCOMMODATION	
'Higher security' Maximum cell beds	6
'Lower security' Maximum/Remand cell beds	9
Medium Unit beds	6
Minimum beds (3 x 6-bed units)	18
Minimum beds ('mother+child' unit)	6
Sub-total	45
SMHU ACCOMMODATION	
High Dependency Unit beds	12
Extended Care Unit beds	18
Flexible/Semi-independent Unit beds	5
Sub-total	35
SUPPORT BEDS (NON-ACCOMMODATION)	
Health Centre in-patient beds	6
Crisis Support cell beds	4
Detention cell beds	6
Sub-total	16
TOTAL STAGE C ACCOMMODATION BEDS	283
TOTAL STAGE C SUPPORT BEDS (NON-ACCOMMODATION)	16
TOTAL STAGE C BEDS	299

Planning Principles

During the preliminary design stage the following planning principles have been followed:

- Access road from entry of the site to the visits processing facility is designed to maintain a separation from the prison perimeter.

- Access road from entry of the site to the visits processing facility is designed to direct pedestrians and vehicles to the visits facility, with a secondary access through to the gatehouse for delivery and security vehicles.
- Visits processing facility is centrally located for ready access from the staff car park and visitors car park to the gatehouses for both Men's and Women's prisons.
- A gatehouse provides ready access to all parts of the central facilities.
- All buildings inside the perimeters are linked by a series of covered ways, which in higher security areas are chained-mesh enclosed.
- Buildings are located on the site contours in such a way as to minimise visual dead spots and provide ready access along pathways between buildings for mobility impaired and service trolleys.
- Facilities provided on the site are arranged in a series of functionally related zones.

Zoning

General

As noted above, the prison facilities are grouped in zones. The first group contains the buffer and secure perimeter zones. The second group contains the zones facilitating prisoner and visitor movement within the secure perimeter. From the perimeter access point these zones progress from non-prisoner to prisoner accessible areas.

The secure prison is the infrastructure contained within the secure perimeter external fence and includes the secure perimeter itself. The diagram below illustrates zoning relationships.



The extent to which each facility has a prisoner or non-prisoner function establishes its location within the perimeter.

Zone Descriptions

Buffer Zone

A 70m-wide, visually clear, inner buffer area outside the secure perimeter, extending to existing or proposed screen planting lines, is to be provided. The outer buffer zone (uncleared) is approximately 100 metres wide. In the case of the Risdon site additional buffer planting is being provided.

Processing Zone

This zone is located on the interface of the buffer and secure perimeter.

The zone includes separate visitor and staff car parking, visitor processing and staff amenities.

Pumps, water tanks and equipment required for fire-fighting purposes are located in the processing zone, as are external fuelling points for the internal fuel tanks.

This zone includes the perimeter road that surrounds the perimeter fence for access by a patrolling vehicle. The road requires turning circle nodes at main corners.

Secure Perimeter Zone

The purpose of the secure perimeter zone is to provide deterrence, detection and delay. This zone provides the barrier between the buffer zone, the processing zone and the secure prison.

This zone includes:

- Razor-taped physical barrier with electronic systems for deterrence and detection;
- Surveillance equipment; and
- An internal prisoner no-go zone to separate prisoners from the energised fences.

The Gatehouse building is located in this zone, being the only entry point to the secure prison.

Non-Prisoner Access Zone

This zone provides access for vehicles servicing the central facilities group. Within this zone, vehicular and pedestrian traffic is separated, and prisoners generally have no access to this zone.

Central facilities are provided on the interface between the non-prisoner access zone and the prisoner access zone. The central facilities are required to be accessed by

visitors, vehicles etc. on one side and prisoners/staff on the other. Where prisoner access is provided into any of these buildings, a series of 'secure locks' is provided to maintain control over movement.

The internal wall of the central facilities building forms the internal boundary of the non-prisoner access zone.

A service road is provided along the full length of the inside of the secure perimeter for access by emergency and maintenance vehicles.

Functional areas provided in the central facilities building cluster will include, in PIRP Stage C:

- Operations and support;
- Prisoner Processing;
- Health;
- Visits;
- Workshop; and
- Utilities.

And, ultimately (dependent upon PIRP stage D funding):

- Catering;
- Central laundry; and
- Remaining workshops.

This zone also includes:

- Refuelling point for prison vehicles;
- Appropriate parking and turnaround areas for delivery and maintenance vehicles;
- Parking for prison transport and escort vehicles; and
- Low-maintenance planting, mulched and paved areas

Limited Prisoner Access Zone

Prisoner resource facilities are located within this zone.

Prisoner movement within this zone is controlled through the use of a covered walkway network. The walkway network is chain- wire-mesh enclosed where it is used by maximum-security prisoners. The facade of central facilities group bounds this zone and a central movement control unit is located on this boundary.

Education/Offender-development facilities are located within this zone, enabling access by both maximum and medium security prisoners.

Workshop facilities will be located close to central facilities with access from the non-prisoner access zone.

At a later stage (subject to PIRP Stage D funding) a sports hall and sports field will be located in this zone for the use of medium and maximum classified prisoners.

Prison Access Zone

Prisoner accommodation facilities are located in this zone. This accommodation comprises both cellblock accommodation, which allows limited prisoner movement and is highly secure, and semi-independent living unit accommodation, which is less secure and allows greater freedom in prisoner movement.

General Prison Planning Requirements

Sightlines and Ramp Access

Both within and outside the secure perimeter, the design permits clear lines of sight to assist with prisoner surveillance.

Each zone will have emergency-vehicle access.

Access will cater for the mobility needs of disabled persons and be adequate for wheeled equipment. There will be no lips at building entrances and ramps will be provided to facilitate the movement of disabled persons throughout the prison.

Fences between Zones

Demarcation fences will securely separate all zones within the secure perimeter.

Planting

Planting is minimised in limited prisoner and prisoner accessible zones to grassing and shade trees only. Planting will not infringe on security requirements. That is, flora cannot be allowed to impede line of sight requirements nor be able to be used as a weapon or means of self-harm.

THE PRISON DESIGN RESPONSE

Design Principles

The following provides an overview of the approach adopted for the design and construction of the new Prison.

Security

The primary function of the existing and expanded Prison is the secure containment of prisoners. This function must be given primacy not only in the design of the works, but also in the staging of construction.

Robustness

The type of institution dictates that all building elements must be of a robust and durable nature to withstand both normal use and wilful abuse by prisoners.

Low Maintenance

It is important to provide buildings that require low maintenance for the following reasons:

- As with any building, the cost of maintenance over the life of the building can substantially increase the total cost of ownership of the building.
- Maintenance of a facility that must remain operational for 24 hours per day and 7 days per week can be difficult to co-ordinate and perform.
- Any maintenance being carried out within an operating prison creates a security risk.

Where possible, the design will use materials and finishes that require little or no maintenance.

Where plant and equipment requires regular maintenance the design will allow this to occur with a minimum of disruption or risk to security.

Environment

It is important to create an environment that, to the extent possible, reduces the institutional nature of the prison.

It is therefore important to design buildings of domestic character to reduce their institutional impact. This can be achieved by the choice of roof forms/overhangs, the size and placement of windows, the use of colour and the provision of open space around buildings.

Establishment of Minimum Standards for Design and Construction

It is important that all systems and elements of the prison be designed to provide a building fabric that is suitable for use in a high-security prison.

The following design principles are being used as a guide for the design phase and may vary somewhat as the design develops further, in consultation with the client groups.

Floors

All floors to be reinforced concrete slab except mezzanine storage areas and some roof-space plant platforms.

Walls

All internal walls in prisoner areas to be acrylic gloss painted blockwork, with epoxy utilised in wet areas. All external walls to be unpainted cavity blockwork.

Security Walls

All security walls to be blockwork (or equivalent) with steel reinforcing bars cast into the walls in a 400mm x 200mm grid pattern and all blockwork cores filled with 20MPa concrete. Security walls are located as follows:

- As perimeter walls of cells;
- As perimeter walls of cellblocks;
- As perimeter walls of exercise yards;
- As perimeter walls of security locks and officer stations; and
- As perimeter walls of movement control units.

Ceilings

Fibre cement sheet ceilings to be used in non-secure prisoner areas and wet areas.
Perforated metal sheeting with insulation above for acoustic absorption to be used in prisoner classrooms and elevated, central area of cellblocks that is out of reach of prisoners.
Plasterboard sheeted ceilings in staff areas.

Security Ceilings

Concrete slab ceilings in highest-security areas including cells, master control centre and secure equipment room.

Security fibre cement sheet (with metal core) ceilings in other security areas, including:

- As ceilings of movement control offices;
- As ceilings of general areas in cellblock accommodation; and
- As ceilings of security locks and officer stations.

Roofs

All roofs steel framed, to be metal sheeted with Zincalume finish.

All roofs of buildings to be sloped to minimise the likelihood of rooftop spaces being used for concealment by prisoners.

Roof overhangs to provide shading to wall and window areas from direct sunlight and reduce the consequent building heat load.

Maintenance Access

All plant requiring maintenance to be located to allow ease of access for maintenance staff.

Covered walkway roof spaces to be used for reticulation of services between blocks. This facilitates ease of access for maintenance of services and modification for future needs.

General Fittings

All fittings within the building (eg door hinges, taps, windows, furniture and the like) to be selected on the basis of durability, minimisation of self-harm and appropriateness for use in a security environment.

Movement Control Stations

Designed as secure retreats with fully secure construction to floor, walls, ceiling, doors and windows.

Access via secure lock so that the security of the station is never compromised by an officer opening the door to enter or leave the station.

Windowed so as to protrude into areas requiring surveillance, but arranged with flush walls in the immediate vicinity for good sightlines. This provides greater actual and psychological security and avoids the problems of blind corners.

Located to allow surveillance of more than one area, to improve economy of staffing.

Orientation of Buildings

All buildings to be oriented on site to allow ease of access and to allow ease of monitoring and surveillance by custodial staff.
The orientation of buildings for climate is of secondary importance to the security requirements of the prison but is also a necessary consideration.

Building Acts Codes and Regulations

The design and construction of the facilities are required to comply with the requirements and regulations of relevant statutory authorities, including, but not limited to:

- The Building Code of Australia, as amended to date and including all relevant Australian Standards nominated in that Code.
- The Tasmanian Workplace Health and Safety Act, as amended to date, and the Regulations under it.
- The Tasmanian Fire Services Regulations, as amended to date.

The design of the facility is also required to take into consideration the provisions and recommendations of other relevant standards and guidelines, including AS1428 - Design for Access and Mobility.

Compliance of Prisons with the Building Code of Australia

The current Building Code of Australia (BCA) does not deal specifically with prisons, the most appropriate definition under the BCA being a Class 3.

There are two options under Class 3 – a sole-occupancy unit, or a dormitory model. Cells are not truly sole-occupancy units and individual cell accommodation is not truly representative of dormitory-style accommodation.

Regardless of this, both models require the extensive use of fire-resistive construction, either to walls bounding the sole-occupancy units or to the common corridors through the dormitory areas.

However, given the nature of a prison environment, the design of the prison will adopt a fire engineering solution that manages the risk in a far more rigorous manner than the deemed-to-satisfy provisions of the BCA.

THE OVERALL SITE DEVELOPMENT

Campus Description

The prison complex comprises:

- A central access or control zone consisting of administration, visitor processing and parking, fed by a main access from Risdon Road. Radiating from this zone are vehicular and pedestrian accesses, both to the campuses as well as to ancillary facilities and buildings.
- The current Risdon Minimum compound.
- A new Risdon Men's Campus.
- Redeveloped Risdon Women's Campus.
- Secure Mental Health Unit (SMHU).

The SMHU will be accessed by a dedicated road and is sited at the highest point of the site to the south. This area is suitable, in topographical and locational terms for the arrangement of the complex, as well as meeting operational requirements.

The prison compounds radiate around a central control area containing the Visitor Processing Centre and Visitor's Car-park. From this centre all campuses are accessible in a secure and controlled manner and at grades suitable for access for people with disabilities, as well as vehicular use. The routes are direct and obvious, and are attainable within an acceptable distance.

The campus locations have been resolved in terms of topography, landscape and relationships to highways and Risdon Vale in order to maximise site use and minimise view lines and impact.

Landscape

Site Characteristics and Vegetation

The prison site is located in the valley of Grasstree Rivulet and surrounded by low wooded hills. Because of its topography and northerly aspect, the site is sheltered from winds that would otherwise relieve the temperature extremes of both summer heat and winter frost.

The area is naturally dry and has relatively open soil, so the site is not conducive to rapid plant growth.

In this environment, the landscape species preference is the local native flora. Trees, shrubs and grasses that are already naturally adapted to the conditions will flourish with a minimum of water and attention.

As well as offering shade and shelter from harsh weather, native species will grow quickly to give desirable screening of the site, and provide a natural habitat for native fauna.

Design Principles

In so far as they impede effective operation of the prison, trees and other vegetation are not permissible in proximity to the security fences or other secure areas of the site.

Landscape design principles are based on a minimalist approach to planting, with an absence of the shrub layer and most trees within the prison enclosures, but with views to more vegetated areas beyond the perimeter fences.

There is a need for the softening effects of vegetation in the prison environment. In fact it is proven that gardening is a positive activity for most inmates, and both local and interstate experience show that some garden establishment will be practical for all the prison compounds, except perhaps the high security area.

Where planting is not practical, ground modelling, embankments, seats and other hard landscape elements have been worked into the designs, to give an element of variety and enhancement to the outside spaces.

Site Zones

In area, the prison site covers several hectares, and contains a number of different zones. Bounded by roads on two sides, and by Risdon Vale and a religious retreat, the perimeter lends itself to the establishment of screening vegetation. This screening is made viable by the existence of Grasstree Rivulet on two boundaries and of other natural areas. The development proposals include establishment of screening with native vegetation along all the boundaries. Local seed has been collected and will be used in the revegetation. This work has already begun, with some labour from the prison and neighbouring community groups.

Between the boundary vegetation and secure compounds is a zone of open ground required for surveillance. This will consist mainly of open grassland.

The compounds themselves all have a clear zone around their perimeter fence, but prevent opportunities for landscape amenity in their design and layout and in the incorporation of gardens and lawns. Aesthetic elements that can be included in the landscape of the compounds are colour, variety, seasonal change, bird attraction, fragrance, amelioration of the elements and an outlook to surrounding views.

Staff and administrative areas of the prison can be a little less restricted than the compounds, and will incorporate all possible opportunities to enhance the indoor/outdoor relationships. Opportunities exist in relation to children's play areas, lunch areas, outdoor meeting and educational spaces and sports facilities. Vegetation and hard landscape elements will be used to beautify the buildings and courtyards.

The prison entry roads, and both visitor and staff car parking, are other important areas that lend themselves to landscape design. There will be some softening of the existing entry road by improving the levels and general alignment as well as by enhanced tree planting. There will be some improvements to the pedestrian approaches, including reduction of the steepness, some existing inclines and separation of pedestrians from vehicles.

Maintenance Issues

Designs for the different areas have addressed the maintenance issues in appropriate ways, including the use of local native species in the extensive perimeter plantings, simple grass swathes in the security buffer areas, and garden designs for the compounds which will have input from the prisoners.

For ease of maintenance an automatic irrigation system will also be incorporated into landscaped areas.

Unlike other institutions, the prison has a labour force to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of the grounds. A program will provide the workers with suitable training courses in horticulture and landcare, so that skills can be developed in the completion of the required tasks.

Civil Works

The overall Risdon site is relatively steeply sloping. This has a major influence on siting of the three compounds for the Men's Prison, the Women's Prison and the Secure Mental Health Unit.

Site benching for the buildings is tight due to proximity of the buildings coupled with a steep site. The design and construction of suitably graded paths connecting the various buildings within each compound will mean that earthworks will require detailed resolution. It is envisaged that some small retaining walls may be necessary. Security requirements for the perimeter zones, (no perimeter sections being less than 75 metres long and no change in grade greater than 1 in 15) lead to relatively large volumes of earthworks. However, it has been confirmed that the additional cost of

earthworks is small compared to the additional security costs that would be incurred in relaxing the constraints. For the site roads, it is currently proposed to re-use existing infrastructure where possible. In most cases some maintenance will be undertaken prior to overlaying the existing surface. The steepness of parts of the site is also a challenge for the provision of pedestrian access and this will be addressed further in the detailed design process.

Visitor Processing Facility



This facility will be of a non-institutional design and will act as the first and most important point of contact for all visitors and staff. Here, greeting, timely processing and registration and waiting of visitors will be conducted in a non-aggressive manner, prior to entry to the various campuses via the gatehouses.

MEN'S PRISON



Security Perimeter

The Men's Prison will have a dedicated perimeter-secure system based on delay, detection and deterrence. This perimeter will be continuous and accessed only at one point, the Gatehouse. The perimeter will consist of, from inside to outside:

- Internal road;
- Demarcation fence / lighting / camera;
- Sterile zone 4000 mm wide;
- Energised fence;
- Sterile zone 6000 mm wide;
- Chain wire / razor tape fence;
- Sterile zone 6000 mm wide;
- Outer energised fence; and
- External road and lighting.

GATEHOUSE



The Gatehouse is a two-storey structure and is the only point of access into the Men's Prison. Separate vehicle and pedestrian access is provided. Vehicles enter via a secure lock. Pedestrian entry is scanned by metal detector and x-ray of packages. The facility regulates visitors, prevents contraband, maintains communications and security measures, and confirms identity on entry, and exit. The building also monitors continually the secure perimeters to the Men's and Women's Prisons as well as the general prison security. It also houses facilities for emergency response.

VISITS



The Visits Centre is within close and direct access by foot to the Gatehouse.

The visits area caters for both contact and non-contact visits to the prisoners by a variety of public visitors, including relatives and legal representatives.

Prisoner movement to the building is from the limited prisoner access zone, via secure locks containing search and interview rooms. Prisoner searches are conducted before and after contact visits. Supervision is required for the prisoners entering this area and for the visit area. Prisoner movement into the search facility is controlled by the central movement control station adjacent to the Visits Centre.

Visitor movement to the building is from the Non-Prisoner Access Zone through a visitor waiting area to both contact and non-contact visits areas. Secure locks separate the waiting area from the visit areas. An officer station will visually monitor the contact visiting and visitor waiting areas as well as control visitor movement. Visitors are allocated a table in the contact visit area or a booth in the non-contact visit area. Legal visits occur in the interview rooms, which are accessed via a secure lock. Closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance with recording capacity is provided in this facility.

OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT



MENS CENTRAL FACILITIES

Operations and Support is the centre for control of custodial functions, administrative and monitoring procedures.

It provides facilities for staff responsible for the day-to-day custodial operation of the prison and is a central facility in the event of emergencies for response.

Access is direct and in close vicinity to the Gatehouse. One of two Movement Control nodes is located here on the secure spine within the Limited Prisoner Zone. This node monitors and controls movement and access within the secure spine and beyond to Maximum and Medium Accommodation.

STAFF DINING



MENS CENTRAL FACILITIES

Access control, movement and security in general govern what can or cannot be taken in or out of the prisons. To maintain security these procedures all meals will be provided and taken within the perimeter by staff. A well-appointed dining area with external enclosed space is provided off the secure spine.

UTILITIES



1 FLOOR PLAN_GROUND LEVEL
UTILITIES - MENS
SCALE: 1:200 at A3

The Utilities building houses major plant and services for the complex. It is located in the Non-Prisoner Access Zone for security purposes and for access by staff and specialists for servicing.

PRISONER PROCESSING



MENS CENTRAL FACILITIES

Within close proximity and easily accessed by vehicles this facility receives and inducts male sentenced prisoners, remandees and transfers from the SMHU and other prison facilities and courts. It includes issue of prisoner clothing and, receipt and storage of prisoner property.

Access is available to the health facility during the initial reception process. Once initial processing has been completed, prisoners can be transferred to the Needs Assessment Unit before moving to accommodation in the Men's Prison. The Prisoner Processing facility is designed to ensure that personal privacy and dignity of prisoners is maintained as they pass through the process outlined above.

In addition to intake and discharge procedures, the recording and records, the orientation and assessment of prisoners' takes place in this area. A secure vehicle lock is shared with the Health Centre.

STORE



MENS CENTRAL FACILITIES

Bulk storage is to be external to the prison, so a breakdown store area is provided. This is sized to maintain a controlled throughput of goods as well as meal deliveries

from the existing main kitchen in Risdon Minimum. Access is direct from the Gatehouse within the Non-Prisoner Zone.

HEALTH CENTRE





MENS CENTRAL FACILITIES

The Health Centre will provide both out-patient and in-patient care. The scope of services to be provided includes general medical, dental, pharmaceutical and psychiatric.

Among other objectives the Centre will provide health promotion, prevention and treatment; medical and allied health services on a clinic basis; on-site mental health through out-patient services by the Forensic Mental Health Services; and a range of other services on a visiting basis by specialists and professionals.

The Centre has a direct connection to Prisoner Processing in terms of initial assessment and will share a secure vehicle lock with that facility. In-patient areas

will be separated from out-patient. In-patient areas will be constructed to cellblock standard. Prisoner and staff access is controlled via the secure spine.

WORKSHOP



This facility will provide inmates with opportunities to develop skills for later use in the community, as well as vocational training and education opportunities.

This is a flexible area capable of change and the provision of programs appropriate to the time, and allowing for changing cultural, economic and other conditions. Thus, the area can provide for a variety of vocational training and work activities.

Prisoners and staff enter via the secure spine. Delivery and dispatch is by controlled access from the Non-Prisoner Access Zone.

OFFENDER DEVELOPMENT CENTRE



A central Offender Development Centre is provided for education, and for vocational education and training as well as for literacy and numeracy assessment and remedial education. Programs will also be available on an outreach basis to flexible areas in accommodation blocks. Access is controlled and scheduled according to inmate level, and via the secure spine. This block also houses a second Movement Control Centre.

MOVEMENT CONTROL





MENS CENTRAL FACILITIES

There are two Movement Control Centres, one co-located with Operations Support at the junction of the secure spine, and the other co-located with Offender Development centred on Medium Accommodation. These centres are secure, with good lines of vision and function as secure retreat areas. Staff can control access and movement to all secure areas via electronic lock systems and camera surveillance.

MAXIMUM ACCOMMODATION



Consisting of two discrete and dedicated wings, maximum accommodation has single cells, buddy cells and cells for prisoners with disabilities, in a two-level configuration wrapping around a central Day Room / Living area. An enclosed exercise yard connects directly to the Day Room.

The design of these, and of all accommodation units, has been developed in discussion with aboriginal community representatives and prisoners, and is consistent with the recommendations of the Royal Commission Into Aboriginal Deaths In Custody.

Dividing the two wings is a back-to-back custodial officer area offering direct line of vision to all areas. Adjoining this area are shared Program / Interview rooms, access to which is controlled.

Movement of inmates within the blocks is remotely and electrically controlled. Access outside of the blocks is via control locks and fully enclosed walkways to common facilities. Inmate movement is always scheduled and follows secure walkways.

PROTECTION



This two level unit is provided for prisoners required to be separated from the mainstream prison population. Accommodation is safe and secure for prisoners classified as maximum security but requiring protection.

Protection needs will be constantly monitored within the structured and unstructured activities program. The format of this unit is based on the standard Maximum cellblock configuration.

NEEDS ASSESSMENT UNIT



This unit is sited in close proximity to Prisoner Processing and the Health Centre. Its configuration is similar to other cellblocks but its function is different.

Its purpose is to provide two levels of accommodation for inmates requiring assessment and assistance before integration into the prison community. It also addresses changed circumstances, for example inmates returning from the SMHU. Inmates presenting low-level self-harm risk and for mental health problems will also be housed here. The unit is supported by a multi-disciplinary team.

This unit is co-located with Protection and the Crisis Support Unit. Each block is discreet and dedicated and separated by a central custodial area with facilities as for other cellblocks.

CRISIS SUPPORT UNIT



This is a small unit, the configuration of which varies from the standard cellblock arrangement due to its specialist nature. It provides accommodation that is safe, secure and highly monitored, for inmates who present as high-risk self-harm. Constant surveillance will be provided both direct visually and by camera. Access to toilet facilities is controlled.

DETENTION UNIT



Inmates requiring a high level of separation are accommodated in this small unit. Because inmates are usually of a more violent nature, cells are stripped of desks and cupboards and are provided with separate exercise yards. The block layout prevents prisoner-to-prisoner contact.

There are no common rooms and access is via a central passage. This unit abuts Behaviour Management but is discrete and dedicated and separated by a central custodial office with adjoining facilities.

BEHAVIOUR MANAGEMENT UNIT



This unit provides for inmates with behavioural problems. In addition to cell accommodation it provides space for programs, consultation, relaxation and external exercise.

In general the cells are standard format, accessed by a central passage and broken into groups for flexibility of use and accommodation. The purpose of the unit is to

provide a less normative environment with increasing levels of privilege earned by demonstration of acceptable attitude and behaviour leading to eventual integration into the prison system.

MEDIUM SECURITY UNIT



These are semi-independent units of six or eight bedrooms.

Lock down is by external door only, inmates have free use of internal space and during the structured day have open use of external areas designated to them. Services will be a combination of, in-house, delivered to the unit or accessed elsewhere, - for example, at Offender Development Centre.

The configuration of the unit is essentially a "shared house" arrangement. These buildings provide safe and secure accommodation for prisoners classified as medium security.

WOMEN'S PRISON



The Women's Prison will be sited at its current location. Extensive redevelopment of existing building stock will be accompanied by new building construction. A new more appropriate perimeter will enclose the new facility and larger open grounds.

Secure Perimeter

The perimeter, from the outside in, comprises:

- 3 metre wide gravel external road;
- 4 metre high energised fence;
- 4 metre wide sterile zone;
- 2 metre high courtesy fence; and
- 2.5 metre wide internal service road.

Pedestrian and vehicular access through the perimeter will be master controlled through the Gatehouse at the Men's Prison. These accesses will be through gate locks.

MULTI FUNCTION CENTRE



This unit is adjacent and in close proximity to the pedestrian gate-lock.

Contained within is the visitor entry control, a multi-purpose / internal visits space, video-conference and interview rooms. External visits and play space will be also provided. A non-contact visiting will be available in this unit with direct access from the Maximum block.

MAXIMUM SECURITY UNIT



This block is provided for female prisoners who are classified as Maximum security. The central custodial area referred to in 3.6.2 also serves as the control centre for this unit. This accommodation block is separated from the rest of the prison, with its own fence and activity in general is contained within it. The layout has a similar cellblock configuration to Men's, but encloses two units. The smaller unit allows for higher security accommodation.

Workshops and Offender Development

Substantial areas of the existing building stock are available and are of appropriate size and quality for conversion to these uses. The existing kitchen, laundry/sewing and recreation rooms provide suitable space, are of very good construction and are capable of effective upgrading to high standards.

UTILITIES



Refer to Men's Prison for a similar facility and description.

Mother and Child Unit

This unit is dedicated to mothers with children. It will contain relevant facilities, such as a crèche and play areas. It will provide a shared-living environment with services similar to community based domestic arrangements. Movement within the unit will be allowed, with lock-down at entry to unit only. Access to grounds will be allowed within the structured day.

The existing building known as the "Training Cottage" will be refurbished for this use and is more than sufficient in construction, finish and spatial terms for these purposes.

Medium and Minimum Living Units

The current two-storey cellblock will be extensively refurbished to provide these units, that is they will provide independent and semi-independent living modes in a 'shared house' environment. Each floor will be discrete and dedicated so that structured days and intermix of inmates are controlled.

A major refurbishment will provide shared bathroom facilities, individual bedrooms and group living/dining and kitchen areas. Recreation areas will be accessible, but controlled as operations demand.

The configuration and standard of structure of the current unit are well suited to extensive upgrade.

Administration and Health

These functions are to be housed in the current administration block.

The functional relationships of the two areas to the prison as a whole and to prisoner processing in particular, is ideal. Health will be sited directly opposite prisoner processing and will house all functions briefed for out-patient and out-reach services. The current building will be more than adequate for the accommodation required, on completion of the refurbishment proposed.

Some services such as Dentistry will be accessed at the Health Centre within the Men's Prison.

Prisoner Processing

The existing Gatehouse area together with an adjacent open courtyard will form this unit.

Located opposite health and central to the campus it will house, albeit on a smaller scale, facilities similar to the Men's Prison. Once again the size and fabric of the current building is ideal for conversion. The vehicle lock provided will also act as a delivery point for goods.

THE SECURE MENTAL HEALTH UNIT DESIGN BRIEF

Introduction

This section serves to highlight the particular requirements for the SMHU.

This unit is to be built on a portion of the land available for development purposes at the Risdon site, but is to be physically and visually separate from the redeveloped Prison complex.

It is to provide for secure accommodation and treatment of offenders and detainees who have been identified as having serious mental illness.

The Forensic Mental Health Service (FMHS) will operate the Secure Mental Health Unit. FMHS is a Branch of Mental Health Services, which in turn is a Division of DHHS. The Clinical Director and Manager will manage the FMHS and both will be based at the new SMHU. A Nurse Unit Manager will manage the in-patient services on a day-to-day basis.

The delivery of forensic mental health services is a specialised and challenging area. It is an area that must address the special needs of mentally ill offenders, the justice sector and the community, while providing effective assessment, treatment and management of forensic patients in appropriately secure settings. Forensic mental health services are intricately connected to the criminal justice system and to the prison system in particular.

The SMHU will be required to be both a Special Institution for the purposes of the Criminal Justice (Mental Impairment) Act and an accredited Hospital for the purposes of the Mental Health Act. Patients of the SMHU must receive the best possible care and treatment for their mental illnesses through the least restrictive intervention while within a secure setting.

In the provision of care and treatment, any restriction upon the liberty of patients or interference with their rights, dignity and self-respect must be kept to the minimum and must be proportionate to the risk they present to themselves and others. The SMHU will function as a therapeutic environment, with levels of security that match the assessed level of risk. Security provisions must be as unobtrusive as possible, commensurate with function.

Operational Model

The Secure Mental Health Unit will be required to facilitate the provision of services that:

- Are delivered within an attractive and therapeutic setting that supports the independence and dignity of patients while maintaining high security to minimise risk to the broader community;
- Provide modern high-quality psychiatric treatment and care;
- Are based on individually tailored psychosocial rehabilitation programs that maximise individual functioning and minimise the ill effects of long-term care;
- Promote return to community living or less restrictive environment as soon as possible for patients not involved in the criminal justice system;
- Enhance the quality of life of patients and address their needs for personal and social interaction while in this setting;
- Promote appropriate involvement in the prison community and/or broader community to prevent isolation and facilitate a return to community living;
- Actively involve patients and significant others in planning and delivery of their care and management;
- Encourage continued links with friends, carers, service providers and other elements of the Department of Justice and Industrial Relations, Mental Health Service and Primary Health systems;
- Deliver care and services within the framework of the client service model; and
- Deliver care and services that are culturally appropriate in a diverse society.

The design of the Secure Mental Health Unit must facilitate the provision of the services proposed under the philosophy and model of care outlined in the proposed operational model.

The SMHU will operate under a management structure of Clinical Director and Nurse Unit Manager within Mental Health Services. Relationships with DoJIR will be managed through a Service Level Agreement.

The hours of operation will be 24 hours per day, 365 days per year.

Infection control, OH&S, equipment or QIC service standards, accreditation standards, security, and national mental health standards will all be inherent to the operation. The SMHU will need to adapt to meet national standards in service delivery as they change over time.

The SMHU will be critically dependent on close linkages with other elements of the health and justice service systems. The methods of referral, admission and discharge

are currently under development and will be embedded in the DoJIR Service Level Agreement and other service agreements and protocols.

The Prison Health Centre, within the Risdon Prison complex, will, as part of its range of services, provide the psychological and emotional wellbeing treatment to the general prison community (those not requiring treatment in a specialist mental health facility) through out-patient forensic mental health staff.

The mental health out-patient service, the Prison Medical Officer and the prison case management processes will be the primary referrals sources for inmates in the prison population identified as having mental illness and requiring SMHU assessment and/or hospitalisation.

The Prison Medical Officer will visit to provide general medical services to patients within the SMHU. The Health Promotion Nurse will visit to provide health education to patients within the SMHU. Nursing staff involved in conducting nursing clinics at the Prison Health Centre will also provide some services to the patients within the SMHU.

SECURITY

General

Security at the SMHU will be of major importance. The facility will function primarily as a therapeutic environment, but must maintain security through the adoption of relational and procedural security systems and the provision of a secure perimeter system.

Perimeter security is not a core function of health provision and as such will be provided by a third party on the same basis as such services are provided to similar facilities in some other jurisdictions.

Perimeter Security

The secure perimeter will be designed in such a way that the perimeter provides the secure line. This will enable treatment and care to be provided by clinical staff in a secure therapeutic environment.

The total security package will be developed in consultation with correctional services and experts in security engineering. Regular escort requirements to and from the prison system and the courts will be taken into account.

Through the use of a security design that minimises the impact on patient care, the seemingly opposed philosophies of care and containment will be integrated.

Relational (Dynamic) Security

Relational security is achieved by staff assessment and observation of patients and the development of therapeutic relationships allowing early intervention to modify behaviours that may otherwise become security problems.

Procedural Security

Procedural security is achieved through the creation of operational policies and procedures that enhance decision-making in areas having an impact on security and security practice. Development of appropriate polices and procedures and the systems to support them will be essential in the commissioning of this facility.

Design References

General

The facility will:

- Have security to a level which reflects the risk category of the various patient groups;
- Meet a wide range of needs (acute and rehab.);
- Be accessible by inmates from prison requiring SMHU services;
- Have a configuration that is flexible/modular;
- Have sufficient space for long-stay patients, including program spaces and indoor/outdoor exercise areas;
- Provide an attractive therapeutic/rehabilitative environment; and
- Provide for ease of extension of facilities at a future date should ongoing planning and development indicate increases in demand for in-patient beds in this facility.

Security Aspects

The facility requires separation as well as security for differing levels of acuity for male and female patients.

The basic internal security concept is based on functions being allocated to zones, namely the patient zones, staff-only zones and visitor/patient zones and staff-patient interface zones.

There is need for appropriate security barriers, such as remotely controlled electronic doors, between each zone, to ensure safety and security of staff, visitors and patients.

Throughout the complex, areas where staff, visitors or patients might be trapped by acutely unstable patients will be minimised.

The facility will be surrounded by a security wall, with camera and microphonic security built into its construction. This wall will not be breached other than at the main Gatehouse entry point.

A staff duress alarm system is to be built into the facility.

Systems to monitor patient entry/exit from bedrooms and ensuites, particularly at night, are to be built into the fabric of the units.

A secure area for treatment will be provided, with access from all units.

Capacity

Thirty-five beds are to be provided in the facility. This capacity will also cater for patients who present a risk to themselves and/or others, but who are not clients of the criminal justice system.

The SMHU will have three separate units comprising the following:
12 acute/high-dependency beds;
18 extended-care beds; and
5 semi-independent living beds as part of a semi-independent living unit.

In addition, three seclusion rooms will be provided.

There will be a provision for a further 15-bed unit if demand requires.

General Design Concept

The general design concept of the new SMHU is based on a "campus" style layout. This layout relies on a very high level of security on the perimeter, thus allowing a reasonable level of freedom within the perimeter. It provides a gatehouse as the one point of access into the facility, forming a non-patient zone. A secure control station above the gatehouse has remote control of accesses as well as camera surveillance.

Admission and treatment areas are housed in a secure zone directly accessible from a driveway leading from the gatehouse. Patient accommodation, visiting and recreation areas are zoned at the highest security level beyond admission and administration. The layout of the SMHU is illustrated below.



Security Perimeter

A secure perimeter, accessed only at the Gatehouse will consist of outside to inside:

- 3 metre wide external road;
- A colourbond fence backed with an attached energised element;
- 4 metre wide sterile zone;
- An energised fence on mesh support;
- 4 metre wide sterile zone;
- A courtesy mesh fence; and
- 2.5 metre wide internal service road.

Gatehouse



The SMHU is a separate facility and has therefore its own Gatehouse for the purposes of control and processing of patients, visitors, staff and delivery / services vehicles.

Its functions and configuration are similar to the Men's Prison Gatehouse and all movements to and from the facility must proceed through this unit. Its location is obvious, directly adjacent parking and all routes leading out internally are well delineated and controlled. The upper floor will house all control and surveillance activities.

Configuration of SMHU Facilities



The facilities are zoned for security and operational reasons:

- Patient admissions (direct connection to Seclusion and HDU);
- Seclusion Suite;
- High Dependency Unit (HDU);
- Extended Care Unit (ECU);
- Semi-Independent Living Unit (SILU);
- Administration; and
- Staff and Support Services.

The configuration allows for controlled and defined access for all persons.

Patient Admission



Entry to this area is by the secure sally port. The Admissions area is secure from the remainder of the SMHU and has areas for consultation, patient property and toilets.

From this unit direct access is provided to a Seclusion Unit. Close and direct access is also available to the HDU and ECU.

Seclusion Unit



Not included in the accommodation numbers is a three-bed seclusion unit for clients with high-risk behaviour. This unit will be an area dedicated for short term management and treatment of clients who require a high level of observation. Included in the seclusion layout is a patient lounge and courtyard.

Administration



Administration is situated on a direct route from the Gatehouse and attached to the SMHU in such a way as to provide controlled access and a secure zone.

It will act as the main entrance for all persons other than patients or those delivering to the loading dock. The unit will provide offices, utilities and amenities for management, administration staff and clinicians.

High Dependency Unit



The HDU will be purpose designed for clients who require acute care in a high secure setting.

The unit's management, policies and procedures will reflect the level of security required to care for clients with high-risk behaviours.

The HDU encompasses two accommodation modules, one ten bedrooms with ensuites and a swing unit of two bedrooms with a common lounge. Common facilities include Lounge and Activity areas, Dining and Visitors.

Extended Care Unit



The unit allows for accommodation and care and treatment of patients with intermediate dependency classifications.

In layout it is similar to the HDU with common spaces, individual rooms, activities and so on. There will be a main wing of twelve bedrooms and a swing area of six

rooms. Apart from some secure courtyard area, patients will also be allowed to use the open immediate grounds, these being separated by fence from other units of the SMHU.

The open external area also contains a recreation building that will cater for exercise programmes and activities.

Semi-Independent Living Units



This SILU will be located within the secure perimeter area, have a connection to the SMHU and will provide accommodation and care for patients who are essentially well and require minimal supervision, care and treatment, together with recreation and activities areas, visiting areas, utilities and amenities. The SILU requires a relatively low level of security and zoning.

The SILU is similar in style to a five bedroom domestic dwelling. It will provide patients at this level of care with a normalised environment to prepare them better for coping with life beyond the SMHU, but to still have ready access to treatment and support.

The unit will be located with some degree of remoteness from other patient areas. Client, staff and visitor access is through the Administration area. Clients will have full access to all treatment areas and resources available to HDU and ECU clients.

Support



Support areas form a core to all units and provide bases for such activities and services as kitchen / servery, staff stations, consulting, treatment and dispensing.

This core area is zoned and secure as a series of pods, along controlled corridor(s).

ENGINEERING SERVICES

ELECTRONIC SECURITY

General

The prison and health facilities will be equipped with security systems incorporating proven technology and reliability whilst reflecting the latest advances in system design.

Major systems will be fully integrated to allow effective and timely responses to all alarms by prison and health service staff.

All Closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras will record digitally for ease of playback and storage of evidence of critical events.

Intercom conversations and non-contact visits will be recorded for use by prison staff and authorities. Static duress buttons will be strategically located throughout the facilities to provide for staff safety.

Gatehouse

Gatehouses will be located within the Men's Prison and the SMHU. The men's gatehouse will serve the Men's Prison and the Women's Prison. The SMHU will be a "stand-alone" control centre with no connection to the Prisons.

The Gatehouses are considered to be the nerve centres of the respective facilities. They house the security equipment "headends" within the security equipment room and the central control room. Prison staff will operate and monitor the electronic access control and intruder detection systems via personal computers and CCTV monitors in the control room.

The Men's Prison entry point will be equipped with a mantrap, rototurn and x- ray machine to detect and identify banned devices and contraband crossing the perimeter line.

The Women's Prison will be equipped with a walkthrough metal detector, and the SMHU will have a walkthrough metal detector and x-ray machine for the same detection purposes as the Men's Prison.

Perimeter Systems

The Men's Prison perimeter will be provided with an inner energised fence and an outer energised fence, which provide the deterrent, detection, and delay factors required for perimeter security. The Women's Prison will be provided with a single energised fence and the SMHU will be provided with inner and outer energised fences. The energised fence provides a pulsed voltage for deterrent and delay, alarm activation when discharged or shorted out for detection and collapsing wires to provide delay. In conjunction with mesh fencing, demarcation chain wire fencing and an alarm responsive CCTV system with digital recording, the perimeter provides a formidable barrier to deter and delay escape.

Intruder Detection

The building will be fitted with strategically located passive infrared detection devices to detect unauthorised entry to critical areas during unmanned hours. Critical doors throughout the facilities will be fitted with reed switches to monitor their physical status.

Access Control

The use of electronic locks, reed switches and door intercoms integrated with adjacent CCTV cameras at critical doors allows keyless access control from the central control and movement control stations.
This method of operation, having electronic and software interlocks, prevents the possibility of two critical doors being opened simultaneously, eliminating the possible entry to unauthorised areas or exterior areas.

Personal Duress

A personal radio controlled duress system shall be supplied to the Men's Prison guards to assist in the protection of staff within this facility.

Two Way Radio Communications

The existing two-way radio system shall be expanded to cater for the additional areas of Men's, Women's and SMHU.

Cell Communications

Within nominated cells, cell services units will be installed to provide intercom, a television service, two radio channels and power to the cells.

COMMUNICATIONS

Voice

The Prisons and the SMHU will be equipped with a PABX with the capability of night switching to another facility. Handsets shall be provided at all workstation/office locations.

Voice recording and account management systems will be installed for use by the telephones provided for prisoners.

An Arunta type system will be installed in the facilities to monitor and record prisoner telephone conversations.

Data

The data infrastructure will consist of single mode optical fibre cabling to switches and hubs located in building communication rooms. Horizontal cabling to desktops will consist of Cat 5e UTP cabling and an outlet will be provided at each workstation/office location for the personal computers on the prison network. The Men's and Women's Prisons shall be on the same network and the SMHU will be a "stand-alone" network.

Video Conferencing

Video-conferencing shall be supported for nominated areas within the facilities.

ELECTRICAL SERVICES

General

The electrical services component of the development includes power supply, emergency backup systems, external lighting and fitout of the buildings. The following describes the principles of the current proposed design.

Mains Supply

Each individual site (Men's Prison, Women's Prison and Secure Mental Health Unit) will be fed from an Aurora Energy supply. This supply enters from the highway and

runs sequentially through the site and out to Risdon Vale. This enables power to be sourced from either the highway or Risdon Vale in the event of loss of supply from one of those feeders.

Unlike the existing prison development it is not intended that the substations and other high voltage equipment be owned by the prison. All new high voltage infrastructure will be owned and operated by Aurora Energy. Each site is to be provided with a substation containing a single transformer. Most of the new high-voltage cabling will be installed underground to maintain a clear zone around each site. Where possible, existing reticulation across the site will be maintained.

Backup Power Systems

Each individual site (Men's Prison, Women's Prison and Secure Mental Health Unit) is to be provided with dual backup power systems. This is required in the event of power failure, either in the failure of both feeders or during the time it takes Aurora Energy to undertake switching to the other feeder in a single feeder failure.

The two systems are standby diesel generator sets and uninterruptible power supplies (UPSs). UPSs provide, as their name suggests, an uninterrupted supply via battery backup. This supply is predominantly used for the security systems across the site and provides for 2 hours of operation. As some of the security systems are microprocessor based any interruption could lead to a loss of operation as the unit re-boots.

The standby diesel generator sets provide power to services identified as essential. Essential services are all security lighting, 50% of circulation lighting, emergency services equipment such as fire pumps and smoke fans, cold rooms, minimum food preparation equipment and UPSs. Sufficient fuel will be held on site to allow the generators to operate for a period of 7 days.

Site Reticulation

Within each site, power is reticulated from the main switchboard located adjacent the substation to each of the buildings within the respective fence lines. Each building is supplied independently to minimise any faults affecting other buildings.

A distribution board located in each building then distributes power to lighting and power circuits. The cabling from the main switchboard to each distribution board will generally be located in the ceiling space of the covered walkways.

Fitout and Accessories

Lighting and power accessories will be of a standard appropriate to the environmental conditions. In maximum security areas lighting is extremely robust and constructed to minimise the opportunity to conceal contraband. In minimum security and staff-only areas the specification of the fittings is reduced accordingly.

External lighting is provided to ensure that camera systems can operate effectively at night. All power outlets throughout the development will be protected via earth-

leakage circuit breakers to minimise the disruption to other services and cause self-harm. Within maximum security areas power outlets are tamper-proof and robust.

MECHANICAL SERVICES

General

The mechanical services includes the provision of heating and ventilation systems, domestic hot water units, vehicle barriers and motorised gates for the Men's and Women's Prisons and the SMHU. The following describes the principles of the proposed installation.

Heating Ventilation and Cooling Systems (HVAC)

Based on packaged units, these are air-cooled heat-pump type, installed in a plant room within each block.

Cellblocks are provided with separate zoning between living and cell areas. There is no zoning between cells. Cellblocks east wing and west wing are treated separately, with a common plant room. There is a separate HVAC system to officer areas.

The system includes smoke exhaust in maximum security cellblocks. Smoke exhaust is based on minimum exhaust air quantity at 1.2 m3/s per system. There is no smoke exhaust from individual cells.

HVAC systems are to be installed in all maximum security cell blocks, non contact areas / and interior and movement areas in the Visits Centre and internal areas in Education and Health buildings within the Men's Maximum Security Prison. A HVAC System is to be installed in the maximum security cellblock buildings of the Women's Prison. A HVAC system is to be similarly installed in the Secure Mental Health Unit. No smoke exhaust is not included in the SMHU.

Heating and Ventilation

This is based on electric space heating, by wall or ceiling mounted radiant panel heaters.

With all areas being naturally ventilated, except internal areas, which will be forced-ventilated.

These systems are to be installed in medium security cellblocks and support services buildings within the maximum security Men's Prison and the Women's Prison.

Controls Installation

HVAC units in the Men's and Women's Prisons and the SMHU will have intelligent control panels incorporated within the units and will have local alarm/control and indication at manned points within the respective blocks.

Domestic Hot Water

Electric hot water storage units are to be located in plant rooms, with circulating pumps and ring mains run in the roof space with valved takeoffs for connection to hydraulics services.

Vehicle Barriers and Motorised Gates

Vehicle barriers are to be installed in the Men's Prison. Motorised gates are to be installed in the Men's Prison, Women's Prison and the SMHU.

FIRE SERVICES

General

The services area of the prison will be designed in accordance with the 'deemed to satisfy' requirements of the Building Code of Australia (BCA).

All areas will be provided with the following fire-safety systems:

- Hydrants and hose reels;
- Extinguishers, fire blankets and breathing apparatus; and
- Emergency and exit lighting.

Service Areas

Service areas will be provided with full sprinkler protection.

Minimum and Medium Security Cell Blocks

The concept design includes:

- Addressable point-type smoke detectors throughout, with protective cages within the cells;
- Sprinklers with residential heads in cells and common areas. Sprinkler protection to be provided in roof spaces; and
- Cell ventilation exhaust will continue to run in fire mode. Smoke exhaust from common area will be provided.

Maximum Security Cell Blocks

The design includes:

- Smoke detection in cells by 4-channel very early smoke detection alarms with the sensor tube located behind a mesh cover. Addressable point-type smoke detectors in common areas.
- Sprinklers with institutional heads within cells (break away).

- Sprinklers with residential heads in cell common areas. Sprinkler protection to be provided in roof spaces.
- Ventilation exhaust will continue to run in fire mode. Sheet metal ductwork with a separate connection from the roof space to each cell in lieu of fire dampers in each cell.
- Smoke exhaust from common area.

Secure Mental Health Unit

The design includes:

- Smoke detection in rooms by 4-channel very early smoke detection alarm with the sensor tube located behind a mesh cover. Addressable point-type smoke detectors in common areas.
- Sprinklers with (break away) institutional heads within cells. Sprinklers with residential heads in common areas. Sprinkler protection to be provided in roof spaces.
- Ventilation exhaust will continue to run in fire mode.

CIVIL

Site

Geotechnical investigations have confirmed that rock is present across the site at varying depths but typically around one metre. This increases excavation costs for building platforms and services trenching. The trenching for services is being co-ordinated to maximise sharing of trenches to minimise cost.

Water Supply

Water supply to the site is by a 150mm diameter main from the Risdon Vale reservoir, some 300m from the site boundary. Two emergency water supply connections are available from the West Derwent Pipeline on the opposite side of the East Derwent Highway. These could be used in the event of a fire as well. The lower elevation of the Men's and Women's prisons increases available flow to the SMHU.

The water supply pipework will be duplicated at each compound, providing separate water supply and fire-fighting mains.

The water supply to the site has been reviewed and with appropriate pipe sizing it is possible to operate the fire services from towns mains, thus avoiding the need for on-site water storage and fire pumps.

Sewer and Stormwater

Stormwater disposal from the site is straight-forward, with existing creeks along the eastern and northern sides of the site. Due to the large areas to be drained, it may be necessary to incorporate detention ponds to improve water quality discharged to the

creeks. Siltation control measures will need to be undertaken throughout and beyond the construction period.

All grates, manhole covers, etc. will be lock-down types to prevent unauthorised entry, and pipework will be sized to avoid both potential blockages and escape.

The site is currently served by three sewer connections, which can be reused to minimise costs. There will need to be some rerouting of existing underground services to allow for the new development, and some interim works may be needed to facilitate staging.

Structural

The building forms are typically very strong to suit security considerations, and hence the structure is relatively simple. A cost comparison between slabs on structural filling versus suspended slabs was undertaken to determine whether to use cut and fill for building platforms or whether to suspend the buildings above existing ground levels. It was determined that even though some rock excavation was anticipated; it was more economical to adopt cut-and-fill building platforms.

Roof trusses have been specified as being made from steel members. These have proven performance and easily accommodate the requirement for easy access through the roof areas for service personnel. There is a potential for hardwood roof trusses to be used in some areas, with cost savings. Hardwood trusses behave well under fire exposure as distinct from softwood timber trusses, which perform poorly when exposed to fire.

Secure walls have been based on reinforced concrete filled masonry blocks. This system is proven from previous secure applications. An alternative, which has also been proven in this type of situation, is to use precast concrete panels incorporating insulation, and this has been investigated. While the unit rate of the two systems is similar, the precast wall panels are much thinner and therefore offer savings in building areas.

Cell layouts have been developed to minimise the need for service personnel to work within the cells.

HYDRAULICS

Reliability of Fittings and Equipment

A reliable service and maintenance history, together with an excellent track record for fittings and equipment in institutional facilities within Australia is a requirement.

Toilet pans will be stainless steel for maximum security inmates. Vitreous china elsewhere. Toilet cistern will be concealed in plumbing duct with extended dual flush push button to all inmate use facilities.

Basins will be stainless steel to match the user facilities as per the toilet pan. Vitreous china with concealed trap shroud elsewhere.

Floor grate supplied to all inmate user facilities.

Safety for Inmates and Maintenance Personal

The building design must provide for the safe accommodation of inmates and patients. This can be achieved by adopting well, researched and recognised standards.

Safety for maintenance personnel must include the regulatory requirements, plus the adoption of several institutional criteria, these being:

- Segregation of maintenance access from main-stream prisoner and patient movements;
- Locating plant and equipment in secure enclosures;
- Locating valves, cisterns, and waste pipe cleaning access points in secure ducts – avoid ceiling and roof space access (difficult and time-consuming to access in an emergency).
- Locating external waste pipe cleaning points and manholes in paved areas, flush with the finished paved surface – avoid burying or locating in landscaped areas (difficult and time-consuming to find in an emergency).

Modular Assembly of Fittings and Equipment

The modular assembly of fittings and equipment offer demountable components that are easier to service and replace, without substantially affecting the whole product and its in-service continuance.

Regular and Readily Available Institutional Fittings and Equipment

The selection of regular and readily available institutional fittings and equipment ensures a level of quality, performance, training and maintainability.

Secure Maintenance Access to Fittings and Equipment

Secure locking mechanisms access must be provided to:

- Openable pit lids;
- Ducts and plant rooms;
- Gratings;
- Tap and fitting handles;
- Spouts and showers; and
- Penetrations through secure barriers.

Sewer Design

The internal building sewer design will be arranged for gravity flows to the receiving Civil sewer outside the buildings.

Cleaning and inspection points will be via, manholes and cleaning shafts extended to surface. Security locking devices will be used on these points.

Pipe sizes for inmate user facilities will be 150 mm diameter minimum, to allow abnormal items to be flushed down-stream without causing constant blockages.

Vent pipes from the sewer system will combine in roof spaces to minimise roof penetrations.

As there is no new main kitchen or laundering facility in Stage C of the redevelopment, industrial waste pre-treatment of waste water flow will not be necessary.

Pipe material will predominately be Upvc, with exposed pipes that occur in non-prisoner use areas being chrome copper.

Waste recycling is not included.

Water Supply

From the point of attachment to the water supply system, a mains pressure supply will reticulate within the building, via roof and cavity spaces, to connect all fixtures requiring water supply for their operation and use.

The water supply entry to each building will include an isolating valve and an inline strainer, so that there is only one point of servicing for removal of debris from the strainer, rather than at each thermostatic mixing valve.

Hot water will be generated and reticulated by the mechanical services system, which will provide branches to supply fixtures and equipment.

The hot water supply will be a high-temperature system, requiring thermostatic mixing valves set at 50 degrees C to deliver hot water to all hot water taps. Disabled facilities will be at 45 degrees C.

Each cell will be separately isolated. Groups of fixtures will be isolated together.

Pipe material will be copper type B as briefed, with insulation.

Downpipes

Where down-pipes are provided from roofs, they will be either concealed or protected from wilful damage.

Down-pipes and gutters will be sized to cater for 1 in 100 year storm for box gutters and 1 in 20 year storm for eaves gutter.

Box gutters will incorporate over-flows sized to match the box gutter 1 in 100 year storm criteria.

Down pipes will connect into the Civil stormwater drainage system.

Paving drains will be provided by the Civil discipline.

Pipe material will be Upvc.

PROJECT COST

A detailed cost plan is being maintained for the Stage C project to ensure that the building, site works and fit-out costs at completion are contained within the capital funding allocation.

The current budget for the redevelopment is $63.5M (at 2001 values).

The Government has also approved both the escalation of project costs for inflation (to be assessed annually) and the application of Contractor Finance, to shorten the construction period and potentially achieve a saving at tender.

The Stage C budget is allocated as follows:

MEN'S PRISON	
Secure Facilities	**$ M**
Gatehouse with Master Control	**2.7**
Secure Perimeter Fence	**3.4**
Operations	**0.8**
Prisoner Processing	**0.6**
Visits Centre	**1.5**
Visitor Processing Centre	**0.3**
Utilities	**0.9**
Maximum Security Accommodation	
2 x 26-Bed mainstream cell Units	**3.5**
Maximum zone movement control	**0.1**
14-Bed Protection Unit	**1.3**
6-Bed Detention Unit	**0.6**
10-Bed Behaviour Management Unit	**1.3**
15-Bed Needs Assessment Unit with	**1.5**
4-Bed Crisis Support	**0.4**
Medium Security Accommodation	
8 x 6-Bed mainstream Units	**1.9**
8 x 8-Bed mainstream Units	**2.5**
Medium zone movement control	**0.1**

Prison Facilities	
Offender Development Facility part 1	**0.8**
Health Centre (with 6 in-patient beds)	**1.9**
Staff Dining	**0.2**
Workshops part 1	**0.5**
Store breakdown	**0.1**
FEMALE PRISON	
15-Bed mainstream cell Unit redevelopment	**1.5**
with Secure Perimeter	**1.0**
Multi Function Centre	**1.3**
6-Bed Medium Unit	**0.2**
2 x 12-Bed Minimum Units	**0.3**
Utilities	**0.3**
Site work and external services	**0.6**
SMHU	
12-Bed High Dependency Unit	**2.4**
18-Bed Extended Care Unit	**3.6**
5-Bed Semi-independent Unit	**0.9**
Gatehouse and secure perimeter	**2.5**
Outbuildings, site work and external services	**1.1**
EXISTING PRISON	
Allowance to alter/upgrade existing facilities	**0.6**
Relocating existing houses/demolition	**0.2**
EXTERNAL WORKS and SERVICES	
Site Preparation	**1.1**
Roads & Paving	**0.3**
Outbuildings/Secure Spine	**0.6**
Landscaping	**0.3**
External Services	**1.7**
OTHER PROJECT COSTS	
Trade and Contractor Preliminaries	**4.6**
Professional Fees	**7.0**

Project Management	**3.5**
Contingency	**1.0**
PIRP STAGE C TOTAL	**$63.5 M**

EVIDENCE

The Committee commenced its inquiry on Thursday, 13 February last when it received a preliminary site briefing. On Friday, 4 April last the Committee inspected the Risdon Prison; the Hobart Remand Centre; and the Intensive Psychological Support Unit at the Royal Hobart Hospital.

The following witnesses appeared before the Committee during the course of the inquiry, made the Statutory Declaration and were examined by the Committee in public:-

- Richard Bingham - Secretary - Department of Justice and Industrial Relations (DJIR)
- Peter Hoult - Deputy Secretary DJIR
- Jim Ovens - Program Manager Prison Infrastructure Redevlopment Program (PIRP), DJIR
- Graeme Barber - Director of Prisons, DJIR
- Roy Cordiner - Consultant to PIRP
- Keith Hamburger - Consultant to PIRP
- Wendy Quinn - Deputy Director Community Support, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
- Peter Wood, Consultant to PIRP (Project Services, Department of Public Works, Queensland)
- Kate Fennell, Manager Correctional Health Service (DHHS)
- Janine Combes - Consultant to PIRP, Stakeholder & Community Consultation Project Leader.
- John Skinner - Consultant to PIRP, BPSM Architects.
- Jo Keil – DHHS/PIRP Liaison Officer (DHHS).

Overview

Mr Ovens gave an overview of the project:

> *Firstly, the site slopes from the south, the high point here right down to the north where it is bounded here by the Grasstree Hill Rivulet, by a small tributary of the rivulet here. It has some very steep areas here and here, so steep that they are practically unbuildable for corrections facilities or for the forensic mental health facility and there is also an area just here where the slope is pronounced. The slope was a big consideration in achieving the configuration on the site.*

The manner of government funding for this project - that is, the decision to fund the heavy infrastructure at the site to provide all of the accommodation for maximum security, most of it for medium security for the male prisoners but to defer the decision about the provision of minimum security facilities to a later date, meant that some of the existing infrastructure had to be retained. That decision inevitably meant that the existing infrastructure, what is currently the maximum security male facility was going to be retained until a further decision was taken about Stage D, and that Stage D submission will be forwarded to the Government at a later stage.

That meant, of course, that the location of the existing principal infrastructure was to remain. It also included the retention of the administration block. The designers have also recommended and it has been accepted that some of the infrastructure here, some parts of the existing women's prison as well as the training facility here, will also be retained. This overall schematic designer site plan retains and re-uses the majority of the existing infrastructure.

This is an efficiency issue in terms of the funding and it also provides significant capacity into the medium term to allow the Government, I suppose, ample time to make the additional decisions it wants to about the overall system.

We have had expert consultancy reports on a number of site conditions including the Aboriginal cultural heritage aspects of the site, the European cultural heritage, flora and fauna of the existing site, landscape and visual issues, any site contamination coming from the use of the site for half a century near your prison service and, of course, traffic issues particularly concerning access to the overall site.

The issues that have been raised in these six separated considerations are all considered to be manageable and have been managed very well by the designers, but those issues were additional considerations in the overall site plan.

It is known, as a result of the investigations, that there are a number of remnants of Aboriginal cultural heritage around this area of the site, probably related to alluvial deposits from the rivulet coming from further up. There is a remnant of the original Gellibrand homestead here, the major feature of which is the mature stand of macrocarpa pines which are here which will form a visual buffer between the new SMHU and the new main prison.

The minor contamination issues raised by the contamination report concerned a tip site here, a rifle range and a few other minor issues again which will be dealt with in the environmental management plan which will be taken on board by the builder and the managing contractor.

Speaking about access, the traffic engineer recommended that the existing access point from the East Derwent Highway is the preferable one from a number of options considered and so it has been retained and with it the entrance to the campus has been retained as well.

Those are, if you like, the overall site issues that have been taken on board by this site plan. The site plan then has been developed in conformity with the correctional philosophy ... is that maximum-medium security facilities, such as the new men's maximum facility, require a certain amount of protective zoning around them for security purposes. So there will be, if you like, an inner zone - an inner security zone here - which will be cleared of vegetation and outside of that there will be an additional zone which is not cleared. This same principle applies to the new women's prison and, similarly, it applies to the SMHU. Whilst it is not a prison, it has a maximum security-rated perimeter and the security protocols around that perimeter have to respond to the same considerations.

Apart from the three new compounds and the existing prison which will be converted or reconfigured so that it can operate as a minimum, as a low security correctional facility, there is a common processing area for the prison service, so if I can just deal with that initially. A visitor to the prison service would enter through the existing road which will be upgraded, will park in the visitor parking area or go to the visitor processing centre and at that point the visitor will be recognised, will deposit any things that they are not to take into the prison and will have their visit - whether it be a visit to a prisoner, whether it be a professional visit, whether it be some other kind of supportive visit - programmed. They will then be directed over to the minimum security prison, to the men's maximum-medium prison or to the women's prison.

Visitors to the SMHU will turn right before they get to this prison service processing area and go by a separate road up to the SMHU. As I said, the existing stand of mature macrocarpas here will act as a significant visual barrier between the Prison Service and the Forensic Mental Health Services.

... The secure perimeter for the men's facility has been designed by our security correctional consultants and is rated maximum security. That rating is calibrated to achieve three things, so I am told: deterrence, detection and delay. These are the three aspects that any secure perimeter has to achieve. The deterrence obviously for prisoners to leave or for any outsiders to enter. The detection so that if an attempt is made to penetrate or cross the perimeter then the person attempting this is detected at the outer edge of the perimeter zone. Whilst they are attempting to get over, through, around or whatever the various obstacles in their path they are delayed an adequate amount of time to allow for someone from the Prison Service to come around and meet them as they are leaving the last of their challenges. So they are both detected on the outer face, and the delay, of course, is the time it would take someone, who was very skilled at achieving this with the sort of implements that they might have at this disposal from within the prison, to achieve it. So these things are assessed and calibrated, and the design of these perimeters responds to that. This is a standard approach which is applied to all maximum security/medium security prisons around Australia today. The expertise that we have accessed for this design is best practice in Australian cities.

I would also like to mention that, apart from the four secure campuses, there are a number of other facilities on the site which will remain. I have already mentioned the administration block. There are a number of ancillary structures here. There is a fire station, a maintenance shed and a number of other structures which support the prison service. There are also some residences, two existing residences plus a number of other residences which will be relocated from their current position along the entrance road to this same zone. These existing and relocated residences will provide supporting staff functions. There is a social club, a staff gym, prisoner training facilities and some other administration functions which will be performed there.

At this point it would be useful to go to Peter Wood. Once a visitor has been processed at this facility and, for example, is directed to the men's prison, the majority of prisoners will go through this gate-house because this has the majority capacity on site for prisoners.

Gatehouse

Mr Wood described the operation of the Gatehouse:

... The gatehouse has a number of functions. The primary function is the one point of access, controlling access in the secure perimeter. It provides access for vehicles through a vehicle lock, with pedestrians going through the other part of the building. It also has a function for security control around the perimeter; upstairs it has a master control where all the high-tech computers and systems are monitored 24 hours a day. It also has an emergency response facility upstairs. Pedestrians walking through come to a lobby and at that point they need to, as you do when you're going through airports, take off items of metal and other contraband and put it through an X-ray machine. You then walk through a metal detector and an officer standing there then controls that process of access. He confirms who you are and then calls through to security to provide escorts through to the centre, whether you are going through to administration or whether you're going through to visit, or whatever part of the facility you are going to.

The other part then is vehicles coming through. Vehicles could be providing service to the kitchen or to the store. Vehicles coming through would then be stopped and they would be searched in the same sort of way as visitors are searched. They also need to be identified, the people who are driving the trucks, and again they are delayed until such time as security escorts can be provided through to the appropriate places within the perimeter.

'In-common facilities'

Mr Wood described the operation of the Visits Centre:

A range of visitors will come to the centre and again they include visitors to prisoners but they may also include legal visit and other type visits. Generally there are contact

and non-contact visits provided. Contact visits are in open areas with tables and chairs which are fixed to the ground and prisoners and visitors meet, and non-contact visit booths, complete separation for those prisoners who are perhaps causing problems with respect to wanting to pass contraband. Visitors come through a series of locks and then progress through past an officer station. Prisoners come through this way, are either searched on the way in or searched on the way out, and they also proceed through various locks to get into the contact and non-contact areas. There is also a number of interview rooms for legal visits, and there's a conference room which could be used for videoconferencing.

Mr Ovens added:

Apart from the visit centre, there is a block of what we call 'in-common facilities' which are built together, are located in the prisoner-free zone here just on the other side of the gatehouse. This really is, if you like, the hub of the prison. There is an additional workshop over here to be provided in Stage C works, but this is really the core of the facilities that operates the prison and provides services to prisoners.

Mr Wood continued:

It might be a bit hard to see where we are now; you have the diagram in the book. This is the medical facility, this is the prisoner processing facility, this is the storage distribution area. This is the staff dining and this is the custodial, administration-type facility. So very briefly, I guess the admin operation support being basically where the custodial staff are based and where they get their support from. Staff dining provided within the facility to try to reduce the amount of contraband that may be coming in; staff are provided with their meals while they're on duty.

The stores, the bulk stores will be outside and then stores are broken down and then delivered through to the facility and then directed through this area out to each of the accommodation areas. The prisoner processing. Clearly this is where prisoners, either new prisoners are coming in and are processed and all their details are taken, medical checks are undertaken and then they are directed to whatever facility they have been allotted to. Prisoners leaving the facility also go through the prisoner processing facility to then get their clothes and their personal goods back before they leave the facility.

The medical facility has inpatients and outpatients - that is, if prisoners need beds for overnight accommodation to treat an illness then they are provided accommodation here to the same standard that they would have in a cell. They also have accommodation for providing dentistry and treatment for cuts and bruises and so on.

Processing of new inmates

The Committee questioned the witnesses as to the procedure for the processing of new inmates, Mr Wood responded:

The new inmates will be coming in in a vehicle through the main gatehouse and then when they come through the gatehouse, the prisoner vehicle then comes in behind the back of the prisoner processing area - there is an area there called 'vehicle lock' - the vehicle goes into the vehicle lock, the gate comes down. The prisoners are then taken out of the vehicle and taken into there.

The vehicle obviously has been cleared from the gatehouse to come through with whatever number of prisoners in the vehicle, then delivered into the vehicle lock. The outer door goes down and there is an access point where prisoners are then taken through and are put into holding cells. There are two holding cells; they accommodate varying numbers of prisoners. There does need to be some separation from time to time, depending on the type of prisoner. The staff within the processing area, which is down the corridor, then call through those prisoners at their leisure. The prisoners obviously have with them their own personal items, which are accounted for, handed over from police or from remand if they are coming straight from remand. Those personal items are then put into the prisoner property area. The prisoners details are taken, one at a time. They work through a process of assessment at that stage. They are also issued with prisoner clothing and other items that are provided for them during their stay. After the processing is completed they may then undertake an initial medical assessment - and that is why it is located directly adjacent to the medical facility on the left-hand side; there is an adjoining door through which they can be taken. Once that has been completed, prisoners then go into further holding cells, waiting for staff to come and take them to whichever facility they are being returned to. Usually, in this case, it is going to be the assessment unit.

Accommodation

Mr Wood described the accommodation facilitites:

One building is divided into two units, if you like. Each unit has a certain number of cells provided within them. The cells are wrapping around a central common area for dining and lounge areas. Each cell has in it its own toilet and shower, bed, desk and storage for approved goods.

The standard cells are all the same size. There are a couple of other non-standard cells, some double cells and there is a disabled cell. There is also a small kitchenette that they use to serve food to the prisoners and a small laundry is also provided.

That cell block is overlooked by one officer station which runs between the two cell blocks. The actual access to the cell block is controlled by a control station which is external to this building although during the 12 hours of shifts there is an officer on duty here and rovers going around, although the only control they have over doors is by radioing back to provide access in and out so there is not a risk then of prisoners trying to take keys off them. This whole process is based on remote operation, electronic and without keys.

There is a small exercise yard off each common room so prisoners during the daytime can access the common area.

Health facility

The Committee questioned the witnesses regarding the accomoodation in the Health Facility. Mr Wood responded:

... I guess to start with you need to have some separation of prisoners because of the different prisoner profiles. That is why there are separate units. There are some prisoners who are quite easily able to be accommodated within one room and you can recognise who they are and they are quite safe; with other prisoners you want to have separation between two. It is providing a range of accommodation for flexibility and that is why we have one and two-bedroom units in here.

In the cell blocks we are providing double cells for reasons of possible self-harm. There's quite a valid approach to assessing prisoners who at risk of self-harm and doubling up with other prisoners so we usually provide at least one unit of two beds.

Mr Hoult added:

... it's a recommendation of the Aboriginal Deaths in Custody ... the buddy system there is in case there are people who we believe are capable of self-harm.

Double cells

The Committee questioned the witnesses as to the number of double cells to be provided in the facility. The witnesses responded:

Mr OVENS *- There are double cells in each accommodation block both at maximum security and medium security level.*

Mr HOULT *- There are four doubles in maximum.*

Mr OVENS *- Plus upstairs as well, so there are four doubles in the maximum security block.*

Mr HOULT *- There's another buddy cell in the upstairs upper plan at either end of each of the facilities.*

Mr WOOD *- In addition to that, the way the design is slightly different. These are designs so that at night-time when the doors are locked and prisoners are in their cells for and they can't get out. The medium security accommodation provides that the external door of the unit of six or eight prisoners is locked, but the bedroom door of the cell can be locked by the prisoner. If there's a group of Aboriginal people who want to live together they can be accommodated in one unit of, say, six and it's their decision then to either lock or not lock their door. This is one way of treating Aboriginals to allow them to live together on this floor.*

Detention Unit

Mr Wood described the purpose of the Detention Unit:

> *From time to time while prisoners are in prison they are not always fully agreeing with what prison officers are asking them to do, so when they get to a point where the officer says, 'No, it is not good enough, you've got to go to the detention unit', we have a detention unit. That is for prisoners who, as I said, are not conforming to the prison rules, and there are a number of cells provided there for desegregation from the rest of the prisoners. Adjacent to it, and not exactly for the same reason but for a similar reason, prisoners have some behavioural problems and rather than just throwing them into the cell and locking them up, we provide this facility for certainly putting them in a cell, but also having then the ability to try to address the offending behaviour. So this is a similar facility adjacent to it so prisoners perhaps could move through this area.*

Cell block sizes

The Committee questioned the witnesses as to how the cell block sizes were arrived at. The witnesses responded:

> ***Mr WOOD*** *- The range of cell block sizes depends on the type of prisoner, but this particular maximum security is ranging from this number of 24 up to perhaps 50, but again it is to do with the prisoner type and the way the prison service runs its service. I guess we're getting into an area which is really to do with operations.*
>
> ***Mr HOULT*** *- To be quite frank, it's also to do with resources. This is an acceptable model based on Australian best practice and what has been built in recent times around the country, balanced against the amount of capital resources we have to build and the amount of operational resources we have to staff. We have looked around the country, seen what has been done, and this has been arrived at as the most reasonable position.*
>
> ***Mr OVENS*** *- ... Generally these days in other jurisdictions which have much larger prisoner populations, the mainstream maximum blocks are 50, so this, if you like, is at the low end of the range. They provide smaller blocks for specialist functions such as the one that Peter was just describing, but for mainstream blocks usually they provide blocks with 50-bed units.*
>
> ***Mr WOOD*** *- The size of these prisons we're comparing them to are 600 beds in a prison, whereas with the men's prison we are talking only -*
>
> ***Mr OVENS*** *- We're talking about 250.*
>
> ***Mr WOOD*** *- ... If the behaviour is considered unsuitable then you move from this 24-bed unit to an 8-bed or a 6-bed unit.*

Mr HOULT *- I think that's why we have to look at the continuum of the accommodation. What we are trying to do is say if we have dangerous people who need to be secured, they will be secured in a maximum security facility, but we could also provide people with the opportunity by improved behaviours, participation in prison programs, and so on, the opportunity to actually step down and be rewarded by improved levels of facility in terms of personal freedom and group size, to hopefully into minimum security where they have high levels of movement and freedom within the boundary. While some people have spent a lot of their prison sentence in here, many others will move reasonably quickly through to more appropriate accommodation and more personal freedom within that accommodation.*

The other point I think I'd like to make is that we intend, through the use of a structured day, to try to make sure that people aren't sitting around. They're not just going to be locked up and left to their own devices. The structure D model tries very hard to make sure that people are engaged in programs and improve their behaviour and their skills; it is not just a sort of pure containment here. That would not be a very appropriate way to deal with this prisoner group.

Privacy/Security of the prison population

The Committee questioned the witnesses as to whether the design of the facility allowed for adequate privacy and security from persons outside the prison boundaries. The witnesses responded:

Mr WOOD *- It is an issue certainly and it is an issue raised whenever we build a centre anywhere. Unless you have a completely flat site, there is always going to be a hill or something nearby on which someone could set up with a high-powered rifle and pick someone off. But in this case it is still a distance away. As you can see from the photographs, if someone was on that hill, trying to identifying someone working within that facility there are very few times in which they are going to be out and about because, as Peter said, they are going to be doing something usually in a building somewhere. I think the risk is quite low.*

Mr HOULT *- To get above the trees, if you look on the horizontal views, the trees will actually shield until you get a long way back and up the hill. So you are getting a very long site line before you can see into the buildings. It is a fairly manageable risk, we believe.*

Mr OVENS *- If I could just pick up on that question and also add to what has just been said about the difficulty of identifying particular prisoners, in this area here, which is the maximum security area, maximum security prisoners do not get out and walk around the grounds. They are secured within their block and there is a small exercise yard which is secured - Peter might just indicate that - and these are steel meshed. The prisoners as a group will be in that secured exercise area when they are released to it, otherwise they are within a concrete walled and roofed building. It is really not an issue.*

Mr WOOD *- From time to time there will be exercise out on the grassed areas, but they are very restricted times.*

Exercise area

The Committee estimated the exercise yards to be approximately 15 by 9 metres and questioned the witnesses as to why a greater area was not planned. Mr Wood responded:

... I don't think it's needed, again we come back to the point that they are not there all day long. Most of them are out and about doing other things. If you go into a cell block in any prison on the mainland, you walk through and if you walk in an exercise yard you might see half a dozen prisoners out there and you might see half a dozen in here. You might see a few in their cells and a few off somewhere else. You rarely have the full 24 complement all the time in there all wanting to go to exercise at the same time. Yes, there would most likely be a basketball backboard here and people would walk up and down as they do in any other prison and so on.

The size is quite reasonable. Again, we have assessed that against a benchmark size and it would be reasonable for exercise yards, I would say.

The other witnesses added:

Mr HOULT *- But I think like everything they do in their lives in maximum security, it's a managed activity. Custodial officers wouldn't allow large gatherings of groups of prisoners anywhere. They will be doing other things. They will be traversing to other core buildings within the secure spine of the facility -*

Mr OVENS *- Peter, you might corroborate this: the sizing of both the secured exercise areas and the internal floor plan are consistent with best practice around Australia, isn't it? The same design consultants who are designing this are designing other prisons at the moment in other jurisdictions so this is, if you like, an Australian standard provision. Is that right?*

Mr WOOD *- Yes, that's right.*

Mr OVENS *- I might also mention that in Stage D, which is obviously not part of the current works that we have before you, there is a recreation gym - a multi-use recreational gym. In Stage D there is a secured multiple-use court for maximum security as well as a multiple-use court for medium security, so they are quite apart from the secured exercise areas attached to the blocks. There is a much larger court which prisoners will be programmed to use on a prison service.*

Mr WOOD *- ... From time to time prisoners don't get on with other prisoners or prisoners feel as though they are unsafe so we provide a separate unit for the protection of prisoners. It's a cell block with the same sort of configuration as cells, a common room and exercise yard. Adjacent to that is a cell block called a needs assessment unit. I guess simply this is where most prisoners would go when they go through prisoner*

processing. They are directed into this facility for the first few weeks of their sentence and then a more detailed assessment is undertaken, interaction is allowed to take place and there's a bit more ability to provide interaction by the use of the day unit and small program spaces. Adjacent to that bit again is another unit called the crisis support unit. It is a small facility. This is for prisoners who are at risk of self-harm or a very serious risk of self-harm while the double beds in the units provided, if a prisoner is at a higher level they then put these units in. It's divided into single-bed accommodation basically - and when I say 'bed' the prisoners really wouldn't be staying too long. It's really very intensive interaction with prisoners to try to keep them down off that level of self-harm.

Medium Security Accommodation

Mr Wood explained the standard of accommodation in the medium security area:

There are four (blocks) which are virtually identical, each of them two levels. Each level is the same, the lower level has two units. The unit on the left has six bedrooms, the unit on the right has eight bedrooms. As I said earlier, these are more bedrooms rather than cells and the distinct difference is that they do not have a toilet and shower within the bedroom, but they do have all the other facilities in the cell. They have a door to which they have their own key. They also have a key which could open the front door; those two locks actually can be a key together, but officers would always have a precedence over the prisoner key. So the prisoner can lock himself in his own room to look after his own goods.

At night-time the front door is locked so prisoners can't use their key to get out. Internally they have a common bathroom, laundry, two showers, two toilets and a laundry area and they also have a small tea servery area and their own dining and living areas. The only real difference is the numbers - two extra beds on this side.

Women's Prison

Mr Ovens made the following submission in relation to the proposed new Women's Prison:

An opportunity was taken by the designers to get additional value out of the existing facilities in the women's prison and the staff training facility there. The campus here is dealt with differently than it is in the men's maximum-medium. The main reason for that is that the majority of female prisoners are minimum security and do not present a significant operational challenge - risk position, if you like - for staff compared with the sort of risk issues that the prison service has to deal with with men's maximum and medium. So the type of perimeter which is provided here is a different kind of perimeter. However, there is a new maximum security facility also being provided with very secure multiple-purpose facilities attached to it. The existing cell accommodation here will be completely redeveloped for medium and minimum security prisoners. The existing staff training facility will be completely redeveloped as

a mother/child facility - six beds - and there is consideration at the moment for an additional one or two beds on the western end for some other specialist groups.

As has been mentioned earlier, there has been capacity built into this site plan for significant accommodation expansion at every level. The women's is no exception. This has been designed and built for 45 female prisoners. There's an additional space here for another 15-bed accommodation block, taking that up to 60 in the future. In the same way there are additional sites in the men's prison for expansion of at least 30 per cent capacity. This part of the existing female prison will again be redeveloped for administration, health functions and prisoner processing.

In this new building, the main building being provided in the women's prison, there is a maximum security end but it's divided into two. It has a six cell, what we call, hard end, and a nine-cell soft end. The hard end really is for the genuinely risky and difficult female prisoners within the female prisoner population to be accommodated. The nine-cell soft end is for other female prisoners who are not ready to go into medium security. They will include some remandee prisoners, so they are separated completely from the hard ones. Effectively, this will operate as two units in one. The designers have come up with a design which quite efficiently allows for these groups to be accommodated and overseen by the one officer post. There is also the ability here, because they are effectively two units, to have separate secured exercise yards. There is non-contact visiting allocated here as well as contact visiting in the multipurpose area. And then adjacent to that there is the main pedestrian entry into the prison so that both visitors to prisoners and professional visitors come in here, are processed and go through a security screen. Then they can go to their secure interview room, another room with a video link in it. The manager of the unit will be accommodated here, and this is adjacent - you cannot see it here, but there is then a vehicle entry right beside it and there will be a vehicle lock here so that female prisoners who are processed here and need to go to the maximum security accommodation will go through a secure link and straight into this building here. Those that do not, and there are significant numbers who will not, will then proceed this way into the redeveloped medium and minimum security accommodation. You might also note on the plan there that the space being planned for female prisoners is quite generous, certainly compared with the very small amount of area that they have at the moment. They also have a multiple purpose courtyard, and with the majority of female prisoners being minimum and relatively low security prisoners there is adequate allowance there for them to have, if you like, more casual and free visiting arrangements. There will be a barbecue area developed. So a lot of their contact, if you like, with family and other groups will not be in closely controlled arrangements, but will take place in this space here.

Education and Programs

The Committee questioned the witnesses as to what, if any, provision had been made for programs. Mr Ovens responded:

The education and programs, the first stage of the education programs area, the offender development complex, will be provided in Stage C. ... There will be a multiple-

purpose classroom, computer room, I think a library storage room, and there is a wet area craft room as well for pottery and that kind of thing. And then there will be the offender development staff accommodation as well. There are 16 open plan areas plus four offices.

That is additional classes and other specialist workshop spaces. Well, not workshop spaces but additional offender development spaces. So you can see from this that something like 40 per cent of the total future provision is being built in Stage C.

... there is a programs room in each of the accommodation blocks in maximum. There is the workshop space also being provided in Stage C for prisoners. There will be a workshop provided there with an industry-type activity in it.

In the women's prison there will be program spaces developed - a large space and two small ones - for the female prisoners. In the minimum security prison there will be ample opportunity to provide program space for the 100 or so prisoners in that area.

Secure Mental Health Unit

Ms Fennell made the following submission in relation to the Secure Mental Health Unit:

... As you are aware, the Secure Mental Health Unit is a 35-bed unit. It is specifically designed for mental health clients. Services are provided in a therapeutic setting that supports the independence and the dignity of the clients within that setting, whilst also maintaining the high level of security that is required. Services are based on individually tailored programs for the clients, dependent upon what their needs are, the idea being to maximise their functioning and to minimise any long-term effects from their illness. The services are also aimed at promoting involvement back into the community and to encourage clients to maintain their linkages with their friends, families and other services that may be required.

The clients that will be within this unit I guess fall into four broad categories of clients. We are talking about persons within the prison community with a mental illness who are in need of specialist mental health care, persons who have appeared in or been remanded from the magistrates or supreme courts on an order, persons found not guilty for reasons of insanity and there will also be persons who are living in the broader community. We are talking about adults who have a severe and or prolonged mental illness who pose a significant risk to themselves and or to others who cannot be managed in a less restrictive environment.

The clients that are within this facility are likely to have a number of characteristics and I think if I just run through a few of those it might give you an idea as to why the facility is designed the way it is. Clients will have a diagnosis of a major mental illness such as schizophrenia; clients are likely to have both a severe and a prolonged mental illness, chronically unstable mental state and or unremitting symptoms; clients are likely to have concurrent medical problems, particularly substance abuse, personality

disorder and or intellectual disability; clients will quite often have had a poor treatment response and or compliance to treatment previously. These clients quite often have symptoms of mental illness that lead to high levels of assaultive behaviours, unpredictable behaviour and socially unacceptable behaviours. Most of these clients will have had a history of prolonged and or numerous hospitalisations and these clients will require extended treatment and care in this facility and will require the specialist care that we can provide within the facility. It just gives you an overview of the types of clients that we will be housing in this facility.

Ms Keil added:

Forget about the prison, the operations themselves and everything else and what it looks like; this is a health facility so everything is going to be different. It will look different, it will operate completely differently to the prison. So if you can just imagine a perimeter around that, fortunately we do have already some screenings so there are going to be trees between the prison and the secure mental health, which is good and cheap as well.

There will be a gatehouse and car parking. As you come through the centre you enter through the gatehouse. There will be a secure zone so the area where you walk into will be a non-patient zone and this area here patients will have access to depending on how well they are going. There is a semi-independent living unit and they will have access around that. So if you come through the gatehouse, to enter, if you are a visitor, you come via a footpath into the admin block. There's a waiting area and reception there so you can come into that. You don't have to enter any patient zones whatsoever.

Once you enter past the reception area, we have a breakdown of units. We have a high dependency unit and we have an extended care unit. HDU is somewhat more for high-risk behaviour and the ECU will be for those who are doing quite well and don't need such a restrictive environment. Basically, it will look very similar, look residential. We don't have cells, we have bedrooms. They are all single rooms so everything will look like a mental health unit.

If you wish to enter the unit further you can enter down a passage way there. The units are divided off into two so they are completely separate. Staff stations are on either side. You can enter the staff station and interact with staff and you still do not have to enter the patient areas. You can go from one end to the building to the other without entering a patient area.

If you are a patient coming in through the gatehouse you come in around the driveway which is dedicated for that. We have admissions down the bottom. So if you are a patient coming in you don't have to share an entry area with deliveries or anyone else; you have your own area. Coming into admission you are processed there and interviewed. From there it is a short distance into high dependency, a small seclusion area or the extended care unit. The access to there is very easy.

Semi independent, as I said, is up the top. Clients can come and go. There will not be nursing staff based in that area but it will be monitored. Staff will be working with clients very closely. Clients will have the opportunity to do that separately but still receive the same treatment work with the staff as required and access staff for 24 hours a day if they require.

There are various courtyards dotted around for each area as well as a recreation facility and tennis court down at the bottom. The grounds will be landscaped with meandering pathways; clients will be able to walk around and feel that they can be relaxed and can have some sort of movement and feel that they are able to get away from others if they need to.

Access around here will mainly be for the semi-independent living unit. If you are in the ECU you can access that if you have been assessed by staff. If they feel that it is appropriate then you can do that, otherwise they have a larger recreation courtyard that they can come out to and access the recreation facilities.

The HDU is a bit different because it is a non-patient zone. The courtyards are quite secure. They will not be leaving the courtyard to wander around. If they were to leave the unit it would only be through the internal passageway. If they were to go outside into the grounds well then really they should not be an HDU client.

We have deliveries, so everyone has their own pathway into the unit; nobody has to cross over. For visitors and families there are visiting rooms. ECU visitors will probably be able to access the courtyard depending on how the client is going. There will be a courtyard in the HDU so families can spend a bit of time outside in the sunshine and do a few things, have some time with children; that will not be a problem.

In HDU and the ECU we have the capability to separate off a couple of beds for women because they would be able to access the unit but they won't share with men. They will have their own lounge, dining area, a couple of bedrooms and they will have a courtyard that they can access as well, and that will happen in both areas.

We have another one up here - lounge, dining. So we have a whole unit there that can be segregated off for women so they can have their privacy; they don't have to feel threatened whatsoever and again they can go outside as well providing it is appropriate at the time.

Open areas, dining, there will be activities in there. There will be an activity area and the ECU will be big on programs to keep clients occupied and rehabilitation. They will be progressing from the ECU through the semi-independent living unit and from the semi-independent to home for those who are able to do so.

Patients coming through the enclosed sally port will be brought in by vehicle and will leave that way as well. Each of the units, HDU, have toilet and showers separate and there are some shared in the ECU. There is a unit of 12 there and there is a unit of 10 in this wing.

... There are a number of areas (for interaction and leisure). Again the swing units here, there are a couple of lounges attached there. There will not always be women in there, so there are a few areas that they can also access and separate off in their own rooms. They are all single and would be very private, so they can do that as well. There would be an activities area for them. There are the visits rooms as well which can be utilised. There are a number of areas, and again if it is wet they have the enclosed recreation area up there that they will be able to run around in and do things.

The Committee questioned the witnesses about the monitoring of patients in the SMHU. The witnesses responded:

***Ms KEIL** - It is difficult. If they need a really high level of observation we can separate them off into the seclusion area where it is very private. Obviously they might be stripping off and be semi or fully naked and whatnot, so you can take them in there and they can be very private and others will not see into that area whatsoever.*

***Ms FENNELL** - There are very high staffing levels in these units as well. If clients are in the seclusion area it is a one to one. If clients are in the high dependency unit we work one staff member to every two clients and in the extended care unit it is one staff member to every four clients.*

The Committee questioned the witnesses in relation to the operations of the High Dependancy Unit and the Extended Care Unit. The witnesses responded:

***Ms FENNELL** - We'd only be maintaining people in the High Dependency Unit as long as they needed to be there from a therapeutic viewpoint. The idea is not to hold people in there unless you have to and to move people into the Extended Care Unit.*

***Ms KEIL** - The HDU and the ECU will function somewhat independently of each other. They'll have their own staff and they'll have their own facilities and that passageway being the divider will keep them separate, so those in the HDU can be managed with their high-risk behaviour a bit better and they won't cross that passageway unless they're really ready to go into the ECU, so they're sort of secured within that area, within the HDU area, themselves.*

Transition

The Committee questioned the witnesses regarding the transitional arrangements from the old facility to the new, in particular, what training was being provided to staff. The witnesses responded:

***Mr BARBER** - ... The role of a custodial officer will change dramatically ... from the turn-key issues to one of more interactive case management of the inmates, and obviously you cannot move to that model overnight. So we have developed an organisational development strategy. We have just recently made some changes to staff development and training which was previously sitting under corporate services.*

We have now moved that area across to organisational development, and appointed a new acting manager for organisational development who has an extensive background history in human resource management, and in conjunction with the PIRP in our transitional operational plan we are certainly developing the training regimes to be able to move staff to the next level.

... It will be different for staff at Risdon, but staff in the smaller facilities are already doing those duties now, because it is smaller, it is more personal, there is more interaction, there are less barriers, and I am talking about the women's prison and the medium security prison and Hayes prison farm and also at the remand centres. Obviously on your tour at the remand centres you saw that the staff members do go and intermingle with the inmates in the actual wings, and that builds up a better rapport. It is a better way of managing contemporary management issues. So, yes, there is a long way for us to go, but we have been doing that work for the last 12 months and we are very confident that, come 2006 when we take over the operation of the new environment, we will be well positioned to carry out the new duties. We are obviously working closely with the main union representative body, the TCOA, on site and we have included those executive members in lots and lots of our workshops on design, so they have already had a good input into the design.

***Mr HOULT**- The other benefit, of course, of building the prison separately is that we will have the new facility available for operational training prior to the decanting of the prison population into it, so it actually gives people a chance to become familiar with it before they have to operate in that environment with prisoners there ...*

DOCUMENTS TAKEN INTO EVIDENCE

The following documents were taken into evidence and considered by the Committee:

1. Prisons Infrastrucure Redevlopment Program – Stage C Project, Part 1 Submission to the Parliamentray Standing Committee on Public Works, February 2003.
2. Prisons Infrastrucure Redevlopment Program – Stage C Project, Part 2 Submission to the Parliamentray Standing Committee on Public Works, May 2003.
3. Prisons Infrastrucure Redevlopment Program – Stage C – Briefing note re the SMHU.
4. Correspondence dated 6 June 2003 from Jim Ovens, Program Manager, Prisons Infrastructre Redevlopment Program to the Secretary.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

It is considered that the development of the new Men's Prison, the new Women's Prison and the Secure Mental Health Unit at the Risdon site will greatly improve the provision of services and the rehabilitative outcomes for prisoners and patients by addressing the critical issues related to the existing infrastructure and by providing a modern, safe and secure operating environment.

Accordingly, the Committee recommends the project, in accordance with the plans and specifications submitted, at an estimated total cost of $63,500,000.

Parliament House
HOBART
7 August 2003

Hon. A. P. Harriss M.L.C.
CHAIRMAN